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The enforcers and the courts have not implemented the merger
incipiency doctrine in the vigorous manner Congress intended. We believe
one important reason for this failure is that, until now, the logic underlying
this doctrine has never been explained. The purpose of this Article is to
demonstrate that markets' need for "resilient redundancy" explains the
incipiency policy. We are writing this Article in the hope that this will
cause the enforcers and courts to implement significantly more stringent
merger enforcement.
To vastly oversimplify, the current enforcement approach assumes
that if N significant competitors are necessary for competition, N - 1
competitors could well be anticompetitive, but blocking an N + 1 merger
would not confer any gains. Because many enforcers and judges
erroneously assume that mergers among major competitors usually result in
significant gains to efficiency and innovation, they believe that blocking
mergers at the N + 1 level would impose significant costs on the economy.
Why should enforcement preserve apparent "redundancy"? First, the
relationship between concentration and competition, and between
concentration and innovation, is uncertain. Underestimating the minimum
necessary number of firms needed for competition and for innovation is
likely to result in harm to consumer welfare. Second, one or more of the N
firms frequently can wither or implode as a result of normal competition, or
from an unexpected shock to the market, often surprisingly quickly. This
leaves only N - 1 or N - 2 remaining significant competitors. Finally, when
enforcers challenge a merger that would have resulted in N competitors,
they often allow the merger subject to complex remedies. But if the remedy
fails, as they often do, the market will have too few competitors by the
enforcers' own estimate. Taken together these scenarios often leave markets
with too few firms.
The attenuation of the incipiency doctrine has allowed many mergers
that have resulted in higher prices and lower levels of innovation. This has
been shown by recent empirical work evaluating the consequences of major
mergers. Moreover, other empirical work shows that significant mergers do
not produce significant efficiency gains overall and often result in losses to
innovation.
A revitalized incipiency doctrine would retain the resilient redundancy
that would preserve competition, while sacrificing little or nothing in terms
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of efficiency or innovation. The enforcers and the courts should implement
such a policy aggressively. One way to help do this would be to vigorously
enforce Philadelphia National Bank's original presumption that mergers
above certain thresholds should be blocked unless the merging parties can
"clearly" show that the merger will not harm competition.
Introduction .................................. ........ 785
I. The Origin and Meaning of the Incipiency Doctrine............789
II. The Enforcers and the Courts Have Not Implemented the
Incipiency Doctrine Vigorously ................... 797
A. The Attenuation of the Doctrine ................... 797
B. The Harmful Consequences of Attenuation ..... ..... 801
III. Why the Incipiency Doctrine Makes Sense: In a World of
Uncertainty It Ensures the "Redundancy" Necessary to
Preserve Vigorous Competition ...................... 807
A. High Concentration Can Lead to Harm to Competition,
but the Relationship between Concentration and
Competition Is Uncertain, with a Range of Possibilities.. 808
B. The Relationship between Concentration and Innovation. 812
C. Large Mergers Are Unlikely to Produce Significant
Efficiencies ................................. 814
1. The Actual Record of Mergers ................. 816
a. Large Firm Mergers Are Unlikely to Produce
Significant Positive Outcomes... ........... 817
b. Empirical Work on Mergers Show Few
Efficiency Gains ...................... 818
2. Shareholders of the Resulting Firm Often Suffer
Significant Losses .............. ............ 823
IV. Redundancy Reduces the Probability of Diminished
Competition .............................. ......... 826
A. The Role of Luck in Market Success.... ............ 826
1. Competition Problems Caused by OPEC ............... 829
2. Competition Problems Caused by the Fukushima
Earthquake and Nuclear Accident ....... ....... 829
3. Competition Problems Caused by Improper
Government Regulation, Including Wrongly
Granted Patents ....................... ...... 830
B. Market Fragility and Vulnerability ...... ........... 830
1. Fragility Caused by Interdependent Supply Chains ... 831
2. Fragility Caused by the Geographic Proximity of
Suppliers and Natural Disasters.................. 832
3. Vulnerability Caused by Political Factors............... 834
C. Competitive Problems Caused by "Normal" and
"Unusual" Events .............................. 835
D. Divestiture Inadequacies. ........... ............. 836




Conclusion: "Resilient Redundancy" Requires Incipiency ............. 842
INTRODUCTION
In 1890, Congress adopted the Sherman Act which prohibited
"combination[s] in the form of trust or otherwise [including mergers]"
that cause a firm to "monopolize or attempt to monopolize [a
market]."' In 1914, the Clayton Act expanded this to include mergers
resulting from stock acquisitions that "may . . . substantially lessen
competition . . . or tend to create a monopoly." 2 This embodies a
Congressional directive that courts should prevent mergers even when
they do not rise to the level of Sherman Act violations whenever they
could cause a reasonable probability of harm to competition. This has
become known as the "incipiency doctrine."'
Despite this statutory command, recent research has shown that
merger enforcement has been unduly lax.4 One reason for this
permissiveness could be the relatively indefinite and elastic statutory
language, resulting in uncertainty regarding the statutory parameters.'
This ambiguity gives wide discretion to agencies and then courts to
determine whether a particular merger may present sufficient risk of
anticompetitive effect to warrant condemnation.
Another reason for this permissiveness could be that the policy
rational for this legislative mandate has, until now, been virtually
unexplained. To our knowledge, neither the relevant case law nor the
scholarly commentary has ever provided a rationale for the incipiency
doctrine. Perhaps for this reason, merger decisions often have only paid
lip service to the doctrine, declining to implement it consistently, in the
vigorous manner Congress intended.6
1. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1, 2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2012)).
2. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)) (emphasis added). In 1950, Congress expanded the
application of the Clayton Act to ensure that acquisitions of assets, however
accomplished, were subject to the same standard. Celler-Kefauver Act, Pub. L. No. 81-
899, 64 Stat. 1125, 1126 (1950) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)). The
Clayton Act has been amended several times. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
3. See infra Part I.
4. See JOHN KWOKA, MERGERS, MERGER CONTROL, AND REMEDIES 120
(2015); Orley Ashenfelter, Daniel Hosken & Matthew Weinberg, Did Robert Bork
Understate the Competitive Impact of Mergers? Evidence from Consummated Mergers,
57 J.L. & EcON. S67, S73-76 (2014).
5. See infra Part I.
6. To the extent a judge is a strict constructionist or textualist, the reasoning
underpinning Congress's incipiency mandate should matter less or not at all, and the
wording of the anti-merger statutes should matter more. The logic or lack of logic
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The purpose of this Article is to provide the "resilient redundancy"
logic underpinning the incipiency doctrine.' Our goal is to encourage
courts and enforcement agencies more faithfully to implement
congressional intent when they decide merger cases.
To state the current approach (vastly, overly)' simply, courts and
enforcement agencies assume that if N significant competitors in a
market are likely to result in a competitive situation that is close to
optimality, then N - 1 competitors could well be anticompetitive.
However, blocking a merger to ensure N + 1 competitors remain
would not confer any gains to the competitive process.' Because most
enforcers and judges operate under the perception that mergers among
major competitors quite frequently result in significant gains to
efficiency and innovation, they believe that blocking such mergers,
absent a clear risk to the competitive process, is likely to impose
significant costs on the economy."o Consequently, courts and agencies
tend to allow mergers until only N firms remain in a market."
underlying the incipiency doctrine would not matter to a textualist. Nevertheless, as a
practical matter many judges are more likely to vigorously implement a law when they
are able to understand its underlying rationale. See generally Robert H. Lande, A
Traditional and Textualist Analysis of the Goals of Antitrust: Efficiency, Preventing
Theft from Consumers, and Consumer Choice, 81 FORDHAM L. REv. 2349, 2360-62
(2013).
7. The term "resilient" in related antitrust contexts was suggested by Makan
Delrahim, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice,
in a speech before the American Antitrust Institute on June 21, 2018. He discussed this
term as well as related terms such as "robust" and "anti-fragile."
8. Enforcement agencies believe that a host of additional factors may be
relevant to whether a merger will decrease competition. To give an obvious example,
some firms are more competitive with each other than are others, so the enforcers and
the courts examine firms' interactions, market shares, industry concentration levels and
changes in concentration levels. See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N,
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 3-4 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES],
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf
[https://perma.cc/A2ZZ-8GVN]. Moreover, the goal of merger enforcement is not
"perfect" competition. Rather, its goal is only to prevent mergers that may significantly
lessen competition. Id. at 1.
9. Neil Averitt originated the "N + 1" underlying explanation for, and
articulation of, these issues in, A Major Rethinking of Merger Practice Is Overdue,
FTC:WATCH, Jan. 17, 2014, https://www.mlexwatch.com/ftcwatch/articles/1336.
10. See, e.g., Joshua Wright, Should Government Bring Back Trust Busting?,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 14, 2016),
https://www.nytimes.com/roomfordebate/2016/11/14/should-the-government-bring-
back-trust-busting ("[M]ergers between competitors do not often lead to market power
but do often generate significant benefits for consumers-lower prices and higher
quality. Sometimes mergers harm consumers, but those instances are relatively rare.").
See also Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. Wright, Philadelphia National Bank: Bad
Economics, Bad Law, Good Riddance, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 377 (2015).
11. Moreover, if enforcers and courts use a pure efficiency approach, even
mergers to monopoly will be permitted under those circumstances when they lead to a
Merger Incipiency Doctrine
N, however, is always an unknown number. The best anyone can
ever conclude is that it is very likely to lie within a range of values.
Moreover, both N and the number of significant competitive firms in a
market can change over time, often quickly. Suppose, for simplicity,
that to be fully competitive in the short run a market must consist of at
least N significant firms, and to achieve optimal innovation the market
also should have N firms. Our thesis is that under these circumstances,
any merger in this market that would reduce the number of significant
firms in the market to fewer than N + 1 (or even N + 2) should be
unlawful due to Congress's incipiency mandate.
Why prevent mergers down to N + 1 (or N + 2) firms? Why the
need for apparent protective "redundancy"? First, the relationship
between concentration and competition, and also the relationship
between concentration and innovation, are both uncertain.
Underestimating the minimum necessary N is very like to result in
medium and long term harm to competition and consumers. Second,
over time one or more of the N firms could wither or implode due to
the normal results of competition, or an unexpected shock involving the
market, resulting in N - 1 or N - 2 remaining significant competitors.
Additionally, when enforcers challenge a merger that would result in a
market with only N competitors, they often allow the merger subject to
divesture focused narrowly on the specific market(s) where the number
of competitors otherwise would be inadequate. 12 But if the remedy fails,
as they often do, the market would then have too few competitors by
the enforcer's own estimate." Taken together these scenarios often
leave markets with too few firms.
Moreover, a growing body of empirical evidence shows that on
average, large mergers do not produce significant gains in either
efficiency or innovation (indeed, the effects on innovation are more
likely to be negative). 14 Judge Posner recently noted that mergers that
result in significant efficiencies are rare: "I wish someone would give
me some examples of mergers that have improved efficiency. There
must be some."' 5 Thus, the potential social costs of a stricter policy
against mergers are small. Hence, "resilient redundancy" will provide
greater long-run assurance of effective competition without any
monopoly but are net efficient. See, e.g., Alan A. Fisher & Robert H. Lande,
Efficiency Considerations in Merger Enforcement, 71 CALIF. L. REv. 1580, 1670-77
(1983).
12. See KwoKA, supra note 4, at 128.
13. See id. at 128-29.
14. See id. at 155-60. In this context, we are using "large" to describe
mergers large enough to exceed the thresholds in the federal Merger Guidelines and
thus to be the possible subject of an enforcement action.
15. Philadelphia National Bank at 50: An Interview with Judge Richard
Posner, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 205, 216 (2015).
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significant negative economic effects. For these reasons markets need
short term resilient or protective redundancy so they will have a
reasonable probability of effective competition, especially in the
medium and long run. The incipiency doctrine means enforcement
should err on the side of preventing possibly harmful mergers by
leaving at least one or two significant firms more than the number
decision makers believe to be the minimum necessary for robust
competition.16 The N + 1 idea thus actuates the reasoning underlying
the incipiency doctrine in a world of uncertainty and change." As a
practical matter, the best way to implement a revitalized incipiency
doctrine would be to vigorously implement Philadelphia National
Bank' S presumption against significant mergers among major
competitors in any market that is even moderately concentrated.1 9 The
enforcers and courts should return to the original formulation of this
doctrine-which apparently was drafted by law clerk Richard
Posner"-which provides that these mergers "must be enjoined in the
absence of evidence clearly showing that the merger is not likely to
have such anticompetitive effects."21 Human beings benefit from having
"resilient redundancy" by possessing two lungs and two kidneys. So
too, the "extra" firm in a market is a prudent investment in retaining
16. The enforcers and the courts also examine entry conditions and decline to
block mergers when they believe that significant entry is relatively easy. See 2010
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 8, § 5.1, at 15-16 (inclusion of potential rapid
entrants into market calculation). It also is certainly possible that firms could
unexpectedly enter a market soon after a merger is consummated. But for a new firm to
prevent the anticompetitive harms that otherwise could occur from a firm unexpectedly
exiting a market or withering in competitive strength, this entry would have to occur in
the same market, and be of the same competitive strength, as the withering or exiting or
withering firm. This cannot be counted on.
17. As Averitt notes:
The starting point, "n," is the minimum number of firms needed to
preserve competition in a given market. This number is derived through
standard economic analysis after taking account of market-specific factors
such as entry barriers, elasticities, company documents, and the like. The
value of "n" will vary from market to market, and, of course, can never be
established with mathematical precision. To this best estimate, therefore,
one more firm should presumptively be added. The extra firm is maintained
in order to account for risks - the risks of subsequent events as described
above, and the risks that the antitrust agencies or the courts may have
assessed the matter incorrectly in the first place. . . . Of course, the
principle of "n + 1" is only a presumption. It can and should be set aside if
there is a good reason for doing so, such as a showing that preserving the
extra firm will cost consumers the benefits of some substantial efficiency.
Averitt, supra note 9.
18. United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
19. Id. at 363.
20. Philadelphia National Bank at 50, supra note 15, at 206.
21. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. at 363.
Merger Incipiency Doctrine
and ensuring competition. It is an insurance policy for competition and
consumers, not an inefficient redundancy.22 This explanation of the
rationale for the incipiency doctrine should help courts and enforcement
agencies understand why the doctrine serves the interests of competition
and consumers. We hope that the logic underlying the incipiency
doctrine will lead to a stricter and more predictable merger enforcement
standard. Our goal is to encourage courts and agencies to implement
this doctrine in the manner that Congress intended.
Part I of this Article describes the origins and varied meanings that
have been ascribed to the incipiency doctrine.23 Part II shows that the
courts and agencies have not vigorously implemented the doctrine in
any of its formulations .24 The next two parts are the core of our
analysis.25 Part III shows that preservation of workable competition
requires the kind of redundancy in the market that the incipiency
doctrine commands.26 Moreover, few if any adverse effects on the
overall economy will come from more vigorous merger enforcement.27
Part IV looks beyond the specifics of the mergers to demonstrate how
maintaining competitive redundancy will reduce other threats to the
competitive process.28 The conclusion briefly restates and concludes the
analysis.29
I. THE ORIGIN AND MEANING OF THE INCIPIENCY DOCTRINE30
As noted, the Sherman Act of 1890 prevents mergers that would
enable a firm to monopolize or attempt to monopolize a market.3 1 But
Congress subsequently decided it wanted to prohibit mergers the effect
of which "may be to substantially lessen competition . . . or tend to
create a monopoly."3 2 In Brown Shoe Co. v. United States,33 the
22. The built-in insurance policy or investment idea and analogy applies to
ecosystems as well as to individuals. See Thomas J. Horton, Efficiencies and Antitrust
Reconsidered: An Evolutionary Perspective, 60 ANTITRUST BULL. 168, 174-78 (2015);
see also infra note 280.
23. See infra Part I.
24. See infra Part II.
25. See infra Parts III-IV.
26. See infra Part III.
27. See infra Part III.
28. See infra Part IV.
29. See infra Conclusion.
30. This section of this Article is in part based upon material contained in
Robert H. Lande, Resurrecting Incipiency: From Von's Grocery to Consumer Choice,
69 ANTITRUST L.J. 875, 876-78 (2001).
31. Sherman Act, ch. 647, §§ 1, 2, 26 Stat. 209, 209 (1890) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2012)).
32. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)).
2018:783 789
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Supreme Court explained that because of what it perceived of as a
"rising tide of economic concentration, [Congress wanted mergers to be
blocked] at a time when the trend to a lessening of competition in a line
of commerce was still in its incipiency. . .. [Congress wanted to] brake
this force at its outset and before it gathered momentum." 34 Thus was
the incipiency doctrine born.35 However, the Brown Shoe opinion never
defined the incipiency concept clearly or explained why it was
desirable. Nor did the Court do so in the other prominent merger cases
of the period such as United States v. Philadelphia National Bank3 or
33. 370 U.S. 294 (1962).
34. Id. at 317-18 (emphasis added); see 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012). For an
analysis of the legislative history of the Celler-Kefauver Act on the incipiency and
related issues, see Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 316-18. "The dominant theme pervading
congressional consideration of the 1950 amendments was a fear of what was considered
to be a rising tide of economic concentration in the American economy." Id. at 315.
Further, the Court held:
("Acquisitions of stock or assets have a cumulative effect, and control of the
market . . . may be achieved not in a single acquisition but as the result of a
series of acquisitions. The bill is intended to permit intervention in such a
cumulative process when the effect of an acquisition may be a significant
reduction in the vigor of competition."); S. Rep. No. 1775, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 4-5 ("The intent here . . . is to cope with monopolistic tendencies in
their incipiency and well before they have attained such effects as would
justify a Sherman Act proceeding."). . . . The Report of the House
Judiciary Committee on H.R. 515 recommended the adoption of tests more
stringent than those in the Sherman Act. H.R. Rep. No. 596, 80th Cong.,
1st Sess. 7.
Id. at 318 nn.32-33. The "rising" concentration that was of concern to Congress could
have been concentration within particular industries, or concentration generally
throughout the economy.
35. The Court laid the foundation for the incipiency doctrine by sustaining
the trial court's condemnation of this merger based on both its vertical effects in the
market for men's women's and children's shoes, and its horizontal effect in local shoe
retailing markets. Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 323-26, 334-35. In upholding the
horizontal analysis, the Court declared that: "If a merger achieving 5% control were
now approved, we might be required to approve future merger efforts by Brown's
competitors seeking similar market shares. The oligopoly Congress sought to avoid
would then be furthered, and it would be difficult to dissolve the combinations
previously approved." Id. at 343-44. The opinion did not calculate the change in HHI
for these markets, but a five percent market share would represent only twenty-five
HHI points.
36. 374 U.S. 321 (1963). Philadelphia National Bank repeated the incipiency
language. Id. at 362-63, 367. The context made the reference largely dictum, however,
because the merging parties had market shares of approximately fifteen percent and
twenty percent, and the merger would have increased the HHI by approximately 600 to
a HHI level of 2000. (These figures are approximations, and the HHIs were not in the
opinion. The precise numbers depend upon whether the market is measured in terms of
assets, deposits, or loans. See id. at 330-31.) Of course, if this same merger were
considered today the relevant market might not be defined the same way. These
structural factors were substantially above the necessary level that would help cause a
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United States v. Von's Grocery Co." On the issue of the incipiency
doctrine the legislative history of the anti-merger laws is
disappointingly vague.38 Nor have any of the dozens of decisions that
merger to be challenged today. It is therefore unsurprising that the opinion did not
define or clarify the meaning of the incipiency doctrine.
37. 384 U.S. 270 (1966). Von's Grocery is often considered the quintessential
incipiency case. Lande, supra note 30, at 877. Yet, the opinion never clearly articulated
the concept or any underlying policy rationale.
In Von's Grocery the Court blocked a merger that would have created a grocery
store chain which controlled approximately 7.5 percent of grocery sales in the relevant
market. 384 U.S. at 272. Although the earlier decisions arguably were justified by
significant increases in concentration, not even a sympathetic reading of Von's Grocery
can ignore the fact that the proposed merger would have led to an increase in the HHI
of less than twenty in a market whose HHI concentration level would have been less
than 300. (These calculations are based upon the numbers in Justice White's
concurrence. See id. at 280-81 (White, J., concurring).) The precise market shares for
the merging companies and for their competitors were of course different in different
years. Further, if the market were defined differently-for example, in terms of chain
stores-the HHI numbers would change. In light of these numbers it is not surprising
that Von's Grocery often is credited as being the high point, if not the actual origin, of
the doctrine. See Lande, supra note 30, at 877.
38. We thank Jonathan Gross for searching the legislative history of the
Clayton Act, the Celler-Kefauver Act, and the Hart Scott Rodino Antimerger Act. For
example, on July 22, 1914, Chairman Charles A. Culberson (D., Tex.) of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary submitted his committee's report on the Clayton bill and in
a brief introduction stated the purpose of the bill was to supplement the Sherman Act
"by making these practices illegal, to arrest the creation of trusts, conspiracies, and
monopolies in their incipiency and before consummation." S. REP. No. 698 (1914) in
EARL W. KINTNER, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW AND
RELATED STATUTES 1744-52 (1978).
Interestingly, Congress had contemplated enacting legislation that would have
included a prohibition against mergers exceeding a specific percentage of a market.
Louis Brandeis, in a memo he submitted justifying this provision of the proposed bill,
explained this in a statement: "I do not say that it is conclusive. It creates a
presumption, as I have endeavored to state. Some might suggest 50 per cent, another 40
per cent, another 30 per cent; it seems to me that 40 per cent did create the
presumption." Trust Legislation Serial No. 2 and Patent Legislation Serial No. 1:
Hearing on H.R. 11380, H.R. 11381, H.R. 15926, and H.R. 19959 Before the Comm.
on the Judiciary, 62d Cong. 38 (1912) (statement of Hon. J. Louis D. Brandeis).
Brandeis's memorandum, an appendix to this source, explains:
Unless absolute monopoly is to be permitted, there must be some limitation
upon the percentage of the particular trade or business that a single
combination shall be allowed to control. The percentage that is to be chosen
must be, in the nature of things, more or less arbitrary. This section of the
Lenroot bill proceeds upon the theory that fairly competitive conditions will
probably not exist if a single combination controls more than 40 per cent of
the business of a single industry. It therefore provides that if a combination
controls more than 40 per cent, it shall be presumed to be unreasonable, but
the presumption may be rebutted by proof. The fact that a combination
controls 40 per cent of an industry obviously tends to prove that fairly
competitive conditions do not exist in that industry and that the combination
is unreasonable.
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have discussed the doctrine explained why the incipiency doctrine
benefits competition or consumers. 39 The cases do demonstrate that the
doctrine can be understood in a number of similar ways. However, our
examination of the 138 relevant federal court decisions and forty-nine
relevant Federal Trade Commission (FTC) Act decisions40 shows that
not one contains an explanation as to why the doctrine is in the public
interest. These decisions contain neither the "useful redundancy"
argument nor any other.
Nevertheless, at least five articulations of the doctrine41 are
consistent with the case law that implements the anti-merger statutes:
1. The incipiency doctrine prohibits even small decreases in
competition. Before the Clayton Act was passed the Sherman Act
prevented mergers likely to lead to a monopoly, or even the dangerous
probability of one.42 Congress did not, however, consider the Sherman
Act approach to merger enforcement to be tough enough.43 It enacted
the anti-merger laws to prevent even relatively small "lessen[ings]" of
competition, decreases that only "tend" to create a monopoly, even if
these mergers would not violate the Sherman Act.4 4 Many decisions
employ this definition of incipiency.45
Trust Legislation Serial No. 2 and Patent Legislation Serial No. 1: Hearing on H.R.
11380, H.R. 11381, H.R. 15926, and H.R. 19959 Before the Comm. on the Judiciary,
62d Cong. 8 (1912) (letter and memorandum of Louis D. Brandeis).
39. The authors are grateful to Jacey Smith for searching for and analyzing
the merger cases that discussed the incipiency doctrine. On August 6, 2018, she
searched for "incipiency" AND "merger" under the all state and all federal filter, and
filtered by i. Cases; ii. After 1/1/1962; iii. Reported; iv. Federal Courts of Appeal &
District Courts & SCOTUS. This produced 139 cases, which she analyzed. Ms. Smith
also searched for FTC opinions by using "all Federal" for the search and under "Type"
put in "administrative," and narrowed it down to after January 1, 1962, and FTC as the
agency only. This yielded ninety-three results. Then under the "sources" tab she
clicked "FTC decisions." This yielded forty-nine results. She analyzed all of these
cases.
40. The specific results for each case are on file with author Lande.
41. See Lande, supra note 30, at 878-84.
42. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
43. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
44. Clayton Act, ch. 323, § 7, 38 Stat. 730, 731-32 (1914) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012)). It is difficult to ascertain the cumulative meaning
of the modifiers of the "lessen" standard: the "may" and the "substantially"
requirements. See the discussion of the "may" language in terms of a lower required
probability of anticompetitive behavior, infra Part 1(3).
This version of the incipiency doctrine was suggested in the FED. TRADE
COMM'N, THE MERGER MOVEMENT: A SUMMARY REPORT 6-7 (1948), which was cited
in the debates over the Celler-Kefauver Act.
Imminent monopoly may appear when one large concern acquires another,
but it is unlikely to be perceived in a small acquisition by a large enterprise.
As a large concern grows through a series of such small acquisitions, its
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2. The merger should be blocked because it could cause an
industry trend or wave toward mergers. Even if the transaction under
review would not by itself create competitive harm, if such transactions
were permitted the cumulative effects of a number of similar
transactions could harm competition. In part to prevent a race to merge
before the industry becomes unduly concentrated,4 6 even otherwise
innocuous mergers should be blocked at the start of the merger wave.4
There are a number of decisions using this approach.48
accretions of power are individually so minute as to make it difficult to use
the Sherman Act test against them.
Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 333-34 (1962) (quoting FED. TRADE
COMM'N, supra note 44 at 6-7).
45. See, e.g., U.S. Steel Corp. v. FTC, 426 F.2d 592, 598-99 (6th Cir.
1970) ("Section 7 of the Clayton Act, as amended, was intended by Congress . . . to
reach out beyond acquisitions which pose a 'clear-cut menace to
competition.'"); United States v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 297 F. Supp. 1061, 1066
(S.D.N.Y. 1977) ("While Congress intended to arrest restraints of trade and
monopolistic tendencies 'in their incipiency and well before they have attained such
effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding,' there is no per se proscription
against corporate mergers.,").
46. It is possible that a merger could cause other firms to merge, out of a fear
that the first merger would place them at a competitive disadvantage. A single merger
could even cause an entire industry to consolidate. This undue consolidation could come
quickly, from a sudden wave, or slowly, from a gradual industry trend. These mergers
could be within the same industry, or in an upstream or downstream market. See United
States v. Cont'l Can Co., 378 U.S. 441, 461 (1964).
47. Of course, efficiency enhancing reasons might cause a merger trend
within an industry, and the enforcers should consider this possibility. Still, a trend or
wave could result in a significant change in industry structure resulting in substantially
increased concentration. While it may be difficult to determine when a trend or wave is
likely to start or continue, at some point-perhaps not until the second or third similar
merger-enforcers ought to recognize the trend or wave and halt it. A merger may
spark a trend for many reasons, including the "lemming" or "copycat" effect.
For example, soon after Pepsi announced that it wanted to acquire Seven-Up,
Coca-Cola announced that it would purchase Dr Pepper. Coke's announcement was
widely seen as a tactical move, one caused by Pepsi's announcement. One possible
outcome would have been for both mergers to be approved, thus increasing Coca-
Cola's market strength. Alternatively, both mergers could have been turned down, thus
preventing Pepsi from roughly catching up to Coca-Cola in terms of market position. In
either event, Coca-Cola would come out ahead relative to not attempting its own
merger. Coca-Cola later admitted that there was an internal memo suggesting that Coke
make a bid for Dr Pepper in part to thwart the Pepsi/Seven-Up merger. See Dave
Skidmore, Federal Judge Blocks Coke-Dr Pepper Merger, ASSOCIATED PREsS (July 31,
1986), https://www.apnews.com/cd2e49ecbc6915ed9Oal46d8cadce282
[https://perma.cc/2UKQ-H98Z]; Andy Pasztur & Timothy Smith, Coke Launched Dr
Pepper Bid to Scuttle Plans by PepsiCo., Documents Indicate, WALL ST. J., July 29,
1986. Both mergers were challenged and eventually were abandoned or blocked. See
FTC v. Coca-Cola Co., 641 F. Supp. 1128 (D.D.C. 1986).
48. See, e.g., United States v. Mfrs. Hanover Tr. Co., 240 F. Supp. 867, 950
(S.D.N.Y. 1982) ("It also runs afoul of the principle that where there is a strong trend
toward oligopoly, further tendencies in that direction are to be curbed in
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3. A lower probability of proof of harm will suffice for a violation
of the Clayton Act than that required for a violation of the Sherman
Act. All antitrust decisions are predictions made with uncertain
probabilities. The Sherman Act blocks mergers likely to lead to
monopoly power or the dangerous probability of monopoly power. 49 As
noted, however, the Clayton Act prohibits any merger the effect of
which "may be substantially to lessen competition or to tend to create a
monopoly."" Incipiency could be defined through a stress on the
"may" language, in contrast to the Sherman Act requirement of a likely
"monopoly" or the "dangerous probability" of one. Relatively greater
uncertainty about whether the merger is likely to be anticompetitive will
still lead to a Clayton Act violation."
4. The Clayton Act should look further into the future for
possible harm. In contrast to thinking of incipiency in terms of
cumulative effects, trends, amount of harm, probability of harm, or
errors, this definition is temporal in nature. Instead of worrying about
present harm, it looks to the future and hypothesizes more broadly
their incipiency, whatever the number, or vigor, of remaining competitors.") (citing
Cont'1 Can Co., 378 at 461; United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 367
n.43 (1963); Brown Shoe, 370 U.S. at 333, 345-46); United States v. Pabst Brewing
Co., 296 F. Supp. 994, 998 (E.D. Wis. 1969) ("We hold that a trend toward
concentration in an industry, whatever its causes, is a highly relevant factor in deciding
how substantial the anti-competitive effect of a merger may be."); United States v.
Times Mirror Co., 274 F. Supp. 606, 616 (C.D. Cal. 1967) ("By using these terms in §
7 which look not merely to the actual present effect of a merger but instead to its effect
upon future competition, Congress sought to preserve competition among many small
businesses by arresting a trend toward concentration in its incipiency before that trend
developed to the point that a market was left in the grip of a few big companies. Thus,
where concentration is gaining momentum in a market, we must be alert to carry out
Congress' intent to protect competition against ever-increasing concentration through
mergers.") (quoting United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276-77
(1966)).
49. See 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
50. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
51. See, e.g., Carlson Cos. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 507 F.2d 959, 962
(8th Cir. 1974) ("reliance upon § 7 is made because of the lower standard of proof
required to establish a violation"); United States v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 426
F.3d 850, 858 (6th Cir. 2005) ("If the enforcement of § 7 turned on the existence of
actual anticompetitive practices, the congressional policy of thwarting such practices in
their incipiency would be frustrated.") (quoting FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., 386
U.S. 568, 577 (1967)); United States v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 324 F. Supp. 19, 31
(D. Conn. 1970) ("Nor is Section 7 concerned with certainties; since it is designed to
stop anticompetitive practices 'in their incipiency', there is no requirement that 'the
anticompetitive power manifest itself in anticompetitive action before § 7 can be called
into play.' FTC v. Procter & Gamble Co., [386 U.S.] at 577. Upon its face, Section 7
makes it clear that the statute is concerned with probabilities. Brown Shoe Co. v. United
States, [370 U.S. 294, 323 (1962)]. The statutory standard is whether it is probable that
a merger will have an anticompetitive effect, viz. whether its effect 'may be
substantially to lessen competition."').
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about the eventual impact of a merger. Suppose, for example, merging
firms do not make any products that currently compete with one
another, and that they are each the dominant producer of related
products. Suppose also that the enforcers and courts believe it is likely
that these related products will converge and compete with each other
in three to six years.52 This prediction, of course, should rest upon
reasonably reliable evidence. Nevertheless, such a merger could be
enjoined under the incipiency doctrine.5 3 A number of decisions have
51reflected a temporal aspect of the incipiency doctrine.
5. Another way to express these ideas may be in terms of
enforcement errors. Errors of over-enforcement (Type I) or
under-enforcement (Type II) are inevitable. In addition, enforcement
52. . This hypothetical also assumes the existence of significant barriers to new
competition, etc.
53. This merger could also possibly be enjoined if the court found an
"innovation market." For an excellent and provocative discussion of this subject see
Lawrence B. Landman, Competitiveness, Innovation Policy, and the Innovation Market
Myth: A Reply to Tom and Newberg on Innovation Markets as the "Centerpiece" of
"New Thinking" on Innovation, 13 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 223 (1998). The
rationale behind blocking these mergers could also be framed in terms of the potential
competition doctrine. See generally Darren Bush & Salvatore Massa, Rethinking the
Potential Competition Doctrine, 2004 Wis. L. REV. 1035.
54. See, e.g., United States v. M.P.M. Inc., 397 F. Supp. 78, 90 (D. Colo.
1975) ("Congress intended that it be employable against mergers in a relevant market at
a time when the trend toward concentration is merely incipient or a probability-as
opposed to an accomplished fact or virtual certainty."); United States v. Times Mirror
Co., 274 F. Supp. 606, 616 (C.D. Cal. 1967) ("By using these terms in § 7 which look
not merely to the actual present effect of a merger but instead to its effect upon future
competition, Congress sought to preserve competition among many small businesses by
arresting a trend toward concentration in its incipiency before that trend developed to
the point that a market was left in the grip of a few big companies. Thus, where
concentration is gaining momentum in a market, we must be alert to carry out
Congress' intent to protect competition against ever-increasing concentration through
mergers.") (quoting United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270, 276-77
(1966)); Vanadium Corp. of Am. v. Susquehanna Corp., 203 F. Supp. 686, 695 (D.
Del. 1962) ("Its 'aim was primarily to arrest apprehended consequences of
intercorporate relationships before those relationships could work their evil, which may
be at or any time after the acquisition, depending upon the circumstances of the
particular case . . . .' And § 7 in its new dress was 'designed to halt in their
incipiency undue concentrations of economic power or monopoly.' § 7 now applies if
the effect of acquisition 'may be' to lessen competition or tend to create monopoly. The
'may be' looks to the future and clearly competition qua competition need not have
been already lessened or a monopoly actually and already created for 'conduct may fall
under the ban of amended § 7 before it has attained the stature of an unreasonable
restraint of trade."); Wash. Mut. Say. Bank v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 347 F. Supp.
790, 797 (W.D. Wash. 1972) ("It requires not merely an appraisal of the immediate
impact of the merger upon competition, but a prediction of its impact upon competitive
conditions in the future; this is what is meant when it is said that the amended § 7 was
intended to arrest anticompetitive tendencies in their 'incipiency."') (citing United
States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 362 (1963)).
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decision-making gives rise to litigation costs, delays, and
unpredictability (Type III error) .' Rational enforcement policy has to
weigh the relative costs and benefits of erring on the side of committing
one or more types of error. The incipiency doctrine teaches that merger
enforcement should err on the side of over-enforcement.56 Under this
model, the incipiency mandate means that decision-makers should err
on the side of making Type I errors to reduce the risk of Type II error;
and limit the risk of Type III error as well.
Congress, however, never clarified which of these possible
meanings of the incipiency doctrine it intended, or whether they were
valid ways to express the doctrine. All of these formulations share the
common characteristic that they recognize the uncertainty of exact
prediction of competitive effects that a merger might create, but that
Congress expected that even modest, forward-looking risks to
competition would provide the basis to interdict mergers.
Congress in 1914 and 1950 undoubtedly favored strict merger
enforcement and feared trends towards concentration. We also know
that the incipiency idea calls for a variety of types of predictions, and
that its ultimate objective is to preserve competition. But,
fundamentally, neither the legislative history nor the court decisions
contain an explanation as to why Congress considered the incipiency
approach desirable." Perhaps Congress's underlying motivation should
not matter. After all, the job of the enforcers and the courts is to
implement Congress's directives as best as they can, regardless of
55. For a discussion of Type I errors (stopping beneficial mergers), Type II
errors (allowing undesirable mergers), and Type III errors (enforcement costs, delays,
and effects on business certainty) in a merger enforcement context, see Fisher & Lande,
supra note 11, at 1670-77.
56. Moreover, one important way to view the incipiency doctrine is as a
Congressional directive to value the anticompetitive harms likely to result from having
one too few firms more than the lost efficiencies that might have arisen due to a
mistakenly blocked merger. The enforcers are in effect directed to value the loss of
enough firms to ensure robust competition more than any possible negative
consequences from having more than the minimum number of firms necessary for
robust competition. This can be thought of as a Type 1/Type 2 error tradeoff, and is
explained in more detail in id.
57. There is a possible justification for the incipiency approach inherent
Congress's decision to place the doctrine in the Clayton Act rather than in the Sherman
Act. The risks of over-enforcement are likely to be lower in the merger context than for
Sherman Act violations, where criminal penalties, and the break-up of an ongoing
company is possible. Because of these severe penalties, a Sherman Act violation should
only be found under relatively unusual circumstances. Since merger actions today
involve only injunctions, however, the risk of over-enforcement is not so undesirable.
Moreover, because market forces will tend to correct over-enforcement errors by, for
example, causing any efficiencies that might have been obtained from the merger




whether they understand the rationale behind the law. Realistically,
however, this void of a logical underpinning for the doctrine surely has
led to judicial uncertainty over its utility, and this could well be a
reason why, as the next section will show, neither the agencies nor the
courts have implemented it vigorously.
II. THE ENFORCERS AND THE COURTS HAVE NOT IMPLEMENTED THE
INCIPIENCY DOCTRINE VIGOROUSLY
A. The Attenuation of the Doctrine
Primary responsibility for initiating enforcement of Section 7 rests
with the FTC and Antitrust Division. It is the agencies that have
explicitly attenuated the force of the incipiency standard.18 The best lens
for observing the process of attenuation is the changing nature of the
merger guidelines that purport to set the agency standards and methods
of evaluating mergers. The 1968 Merger Guidelines explicitly mirror
the Philadelphia National Bank (PNB) presumption.5 9 Market
concentration is central and there is no suggestion that there is a need to
show any particular competitive effect:
[A] concentrated market structure . . . tends to discourage
vigorous price competition . . . and to encourage other kinds
of conduct . . . of an economically undesirable nature.
Moreover . . . an enforcement policy emphasizing a limited
number of structural factors . . . facilitates both enforcement
decision-making and business planning .... 6
Thus, the 1968 Guidelines focused on changes in market structure
as the key variable while recognizing that in some limited cases special
characteristics of the target might justify objection even if the structural
58. State and private enforcers also challenge mergers. The following
discussion of the evolution and effects of the merger guidelines is based on Peter C.
Carstensen, The Philadelphia National Bank Presumption: Merger Analysis in an
Unpredictable World, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 219, 236-41 (2015).
59. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES (1968) [hereinafter 1968
MERGER GUIDELINES], https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1968-merger-guidelines
[https://perma.cc/2YWL-V58M].
60. Id. 1 2; see also Mark J. Neifer, Donald F. Turner at the Antitrust
Division: A Reconsideration of Merger Policy in the 1960s, 29 ANTITRUST 53, 53
(2015) ("Turner . . . conclude[d] that merger policy should focus on the formulation




criteria were not satisfied.61 Equally significant, they rejected
consideration of "economies" where the merger violated the structural
standards, "[u]nless there are exceptional circumstances . . . ."62 Under
the 1968 Guidelines, merger evaluation largely focused on market
definition and measures of concentration. At the same time, the
standards they articulated left enough discretion to permit not pursuing
cases at the margins of market concentration concern, especially where
the potential for gains were more likely or the risks to competition
seemed more attenuated. By contrast, the 1982 Merger Guidelines have
a tone which suggests that most mergers are good for the economy:
"Although they sometimes harm competition, mergers generally play
an important role in a free enterprise economy. They can penalize
ineffective management and facilitate the efficient flow of investment
capital and the redeployment of existing productive assets." 63 These
Guidelines also explicitly introduced the need to verify the likelihood of
a potential competitive effect as an element of the decision to challenge
a merger.64 In the discussion of "Other Factors" the focus of the test is
on whether or not the resulting combination would result in a
"cartel." 6 5 Indeed, the text suggested that unless the investigation shows
that a cartel is substantially likely there would be no objection. The
Assistant Attorney General (AAG), J. Paul McGrath candidly stated
that he would ignore the plain language of the Clayton Act: "Antitrust
enforcers should only block mergers when they conclude, based on
sound economic analysis, that a particular transaction will adversely
affect competition. "66
Instead of the statute's "may" language, McGrath made it clear
that before the DOJ would challenge a merger, the Antitrust Division
61. 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59, ¶ 17; see also Neifer, supra
note 60, at 57 ("[T]he Guidelines articulate simple, administrable rules focused on a
few key factors, including, most importantly, market structure.").
62. 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 59, ¶ 10 (explaining that because
the "mergers . . . most likely to . . . achieve significant economies of scale" are
unlikely to be challenged under the guideline structural standards, internal expansion is
likely to be available where substantial economies can be achieved, and "there are
usually severe difficulties in accurately establishing the existence and magnitude of
economies claimed for a merger").
63. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MERGER GUIDELINES, at Sections I, 111.1 (1982)
[hereinafter 1982 MERGER GUIDELINES], https://www.justice.gov/archives/atr/1982-
merger-guidelines [https://perma.cc/4S3R-3EYG] ("[E]ven in concentrated markets, it
is desirable to allow firms some scope for merger activity in order to achieve
economies of scale and to permit exit from the market.").
64. Id. at Section IV.A.1-3.
65. Id. at Section III.C.
66. J. Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Merger Policy




wanted to be satisfied that there "will" be a specific kind of competitive
effect, a collusive effect.
The 1982 Merger Guidelines, however, retain strong skepticism
about efficiency defenses: "Except in extraordinary cases, the
Department will not consider a claim of specific efficiencies as a
mitigating factor for a merger that would otherwise be challenged.
Plausible efficiencies are far easier to allege than to prove. Moreover,
even if the existence of efficiencies were clear, their magnitudes would
be extremely difficult to determine. "67 Since the introduction to the
1982 Guidelines suggests that most mergers are desirable, perhaps these
Guidelines embody the belief that most merger-specific efficiencies
result from sub-Guideline mergers. The 1992 Merger Guidelines
dropped the explicitly pro-merger introduction of 1982 Merger
Guidelines, but its framework commits the agencies to finding a
specific, identifiable, and likely effect before challenging a merger.6 8
The relevant inquiry in merger evaluation, they explain, is "whether the
merger, in light of market concentration and other factors that
characterize the market, raises concern about potential adverse
competitive effects" and whether there are "any efficiency gains that . .
. cannot be achieved . . . through other means. " 69 Moreover, they
opened the door to those "eas[y] to allege" efficiency claims that even
the 1982 Merger Guidelines had abjured. Consideration of efficiency
claims was also the focus of the 1997 revision to the 1992 Guidelines,
which presented anew arguments that mergers are likely to yield
competitive benefits, including mergers among major firms who are the
primary focus of the prohibitions of Section 7. 70 The agencies declared
that:
[M]ergers have the potential to generate significant
efficiencies by permitting a better utilization of existing
assets, enabling the combined firm to achieve lower costs in
producing a given quantity and quality than either firm could
have achieved without the proposed transaction. Indeed, the
primary benefit of mergers to the economy is their potential to
generate such efficiencies.n
67. Id. at 29.
68. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, HORIZONTAL MERGER
GUIDELINES 3, 17-24, 28 (1992, rev. 1997) [hereinafter 1992 MERGER GUIDELINES],
https://www.justice.gov/atr/horizontal-merger-guidelines-o [https://perma.cc/JQM7-
C8NA].
69. Id. at 3.
70. Id. at 30-32.
71. Id. at 30.
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This policy assumes that firms with very large shares of American
markets often can achieve substantial efficiencies by acquiring direct
competitors. At its core, the 1997 revision assumed an essentially
desirable function for mergers, even those involving consolidation of
competitors resulting in significant increases in concentration. As a
result, it invited parties to fashion arguments to justify the merger based
on some theory that there would be little risk of the competitive effects
identified in the guidelines or putative efficiency gains would offset any
risk of harm.
The Commentary on the Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued in
2006 highlights the changed nature of merger evaluation.
Approximately half of the fifty-nine pages of text is devoted to the
issues of how the agencies determined either competitive effects or
efficiency gains.72 Even a cursory review shows that even where a
merger involved overwhelming market shares, the agencies felt obliged
to demonstrate that some specific adverse effect on competition might
well occur. The descriptions also signal the amount of case-by-case
evaluation that economists and lawyers would have made to reach those
conclusions. This process is the one that the PNB presumption sought to
avoid. The 2010 Guidelines, their current iteration, continues the
return to the open-ended, pre-Brown Shoe review of mergers .3 Many
observers have recognized that the 2010 Guidelines move even further
away from a clear structural analysis.74 Instead, a holistic approach akin
to that urged in 1955 by the Attorney General's committee to review
antitrust is now the primary review methodology . That report had
concluded that there can be a violation only if a "prospective adverse
impact in defined markets can be shown."7 6 Although the specifics of
such proof as set forth in 1955 by a committee reflecting contemporary
methods are not the same as those invoked in 2010, the open-ended,
case-specific inquiry proposed is methodological similar.77 So after a
half century, the merger review process has come full circle and
72. U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, COMMENTARY ON THE
HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 17-36, 49-58 (2006),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-
review/commentaryonthehorizontalmergerguidelinesmarch 2 006 .pdf
[https://perma.cc/CS5G-YZH2] (pages 17-36 discuss competitive effects-at twenty
pages, this is the longest part of the document; pages 49-58 discuss efficiencies).
73. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 8.
74. See, e.g., Carl Shapiro, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines: From
Hedgehog to Fox in Forty Years, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 49, 55-57 (2010).
75. See REPORT OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S NATIONAL COMMITTEE TO
STUDY THE ANTITRUST LAWS 115-28 (1955).
76. Id. at 122.
77. Compare id. at 124-27, with 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 8, §
6.1, at 20-22 ("Pricing of Differentiated Products").
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returned to the pre-PNB open-ended review process condemned by
Derek Bok in 1960.
An unwillingness to recognize the limits of our understanding
hardens resistance to simple rules because of the false hope that more
information can somehow dispel doubts about the consequences of a
disputed merger. Similarly, the virtues of clarity and simplicity are
foregone, for it is thought that rules that embody these characteristics
are needlessly arbitrary when in fact they are no more so than their
more complicated counterparts.
B. The Harmfid Consequences of Attenuation79
In 2015 Professor John Kwoka published a book containing a
meta-analysis of post-merger evaluation studies to evaluate the impact
on prices of mergers that were not successfully challenged.80 Of the
forty-two mergers that were subject to credible post-merger evaluation,
thirty-four resulted in price increases, often substantial, and only eight
had price declines. 8' Moreover, of the thirty-four where post-merger
evidence showed harm to competition, the agencies challenged only
thirteen and did not object to twenty-one.82 Professor Kwoka also
evaluated some an additional nineteen studies that provided aggregated
analyses of over - 3000 mergers that "corroborate the findings of the
single-merger studies . . . [that such] mergers tend to result in
performance deterioration." 8 3 Kwoka's evidence led him to conclude
that "the agencies . . . fail[ed] to challenge a considerable fraction of
those [mergers] that result[ed] in price increases." 84 Moreover, the
enforcers' proclivity to settle cases based on partial divestiture or even
conduct controls (i.e., allowing a significant increase in concentration)
raises further concerns, since "neither type of remedy [in the cases
where there was a challenge resulting in a remedy] . . . seems to have
78. See Derek C. Bok, Section 7 of the Clayton Act and the Merging of Law
and Economics, 74 HARV. L. REV. 226, 349 (1960). Essentially Bok was warning about
Type III errors. See id.
79. This section is in part based upon Carstensen, supra note 58, at 242, 265.
80. KwOKA, supra note 4, 71-82.
81. Id. at 112-13.
82. Id. at 113 tbl. 7.3. But five of the negatives were in industries (railroads
and airlines) where the agencies had no authority to challenge the actual merger. Id. at
115.
83 Id. at 146, 149.
84. Id. at 126; see also John E. Kwoka, Does Merger Control Work?, 78
ANTITRUST L.J. 619, 644 (2013).
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been especially effective in restraining postmerger price increases." 5
His review of these post-merger studies also found that there were
adverse quality effects in many situations and that efficiency gains were
at best mixed.86
Thus, the post-merger data in the forty-two mergers subject to
merger specific studies showed that in approximately eighty percent of
the cases the increased concentration resulted in higher prices and often
other adverse effects on the quality of competition." The aggregated
merger studies further confirmed these results." No matter which of the
five definitions of "relatively strict merger" enforcement discussed in
Part II one chooses, Kwoka's results show that the enforcers have not
implemented the incipiency doctrine. It is certainly possible that a large
part of some enforcers' reluctance to challenge mergers, or their
decisions to accept relatively weak settlements, came from their fears
that the reviewing courts would not sustain such challenges.
There have been critiques of Kwoka's research." Drs. Vita and
Osinski, senior FTC economists (who, we presume, based upon the
acknowledgements, had the assistance of a large number of FTC staff)
argued that Kwoka had used the "wrong" statistical method to frame
his meta-analysis.90 However, Vita and Osinski did not dispute that all
but one of the studies Kwoka relied on supported his general
conclusion. Nor did they evaluate the other evidence he cited in support
of his general conclusion. Kwoka in response argued that the method he
used was appropriate for social science analysis and the proffered
alternative is one used primarily in medical and other scientific
analyses.9 1 These critics did point out that one of the studies on which
he relied was inapposite because it did not have price data for the
period following the imposition of remedies. Kwoka acknowledged this
85. KwoKA, supra note 4, at 120. In the case of structural remedies, post-
merger prices increased on average more than six percent and conduct remedies
resulted in average increases of nearly thirteen percent. Id.
86. See id. at 100 (quality measures); id. at 148 (efficiency).
87. Id. at 113.
88. Id. at 143-52 (describing nineteen such studies).
89. See J. Langenfeld, The Empirical Basis for Antitrust: Cartels, Mergers,
and Remedies, 24 INT'L. J. EcON. Bus. 233 (2017); Michael Vita & David Osinski,
John Kwoka's Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Critical Review, 82
ANTITRUST L.J. 361 (2018).
90. Vita & Osinski, supra note 89, at 377-81.
91. See John Kwoka, Mergers, Merger Control, and Remedies: A Response
to the FTC Critique 9-10 (Mar. 31, 2017) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2947814 [https://perma.cc/9MLF-KBJF]. This paper also
responded to Langenfeld's criticism. See id. at 4 n.7.
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error but pointed out that it only modified and did not alter his
fundamental points.92
Professor Kwoka's work is only one of a number of studies that
reach similar conclusions (although it certainly is the most
comprehensive and prominent).9 None, of course, is free from
technical disputes, but the general tenor of these studies is that merger
policy has failed to control effectively the competitive risks of mergers
among major competitors. This is reflected as well in a growing
concern with overall concentration of markets and its impact on
growth. Jason Furman, chair of the Council of Economic Advisers, in a
September 2016 speech stressed "that competition can play an
important and broader role not just in static, allocative efficiency but
also in dynamic efficiency-making the economy more innovative and
increasing productivity growth." 94 To have a workably competitive
economy requires at a minimum that there be a significant number of
competing firms in each market. 95
Another recent study looked at the effects of mergers on market
power and efficiency. Using a comprehensive data set on manufacturing
plant acquisitions that matched acquired plants with those that were not
purchased, the study found that at the plant level acquisitions resulted in
"significantly increase[d] markups on average, but ha[d] no statistically
significant average effect on productivity." 9 6 Moreover, the adverse
effects are "strongest" when the acquisition is horizontal. 97 Because
many plants are only elements in a larger corporation, the study also
examined whether the firm owning the plant experienced productivity
gains. Again, the results were that there was "no evidence for
efficiency gains" and the buyers did not even eliminate the least
92. Id. at 14-16. Kwoka also stressed that Vita and Oginski failed to consider
the other data set that he had relied upon. Id. at 4-5 (citing KWOKA, supra note 4).
93. See, e.g., Orley Ashenfelter & Daniel Hosken, The Effect of Mergers on
Consumer Prices: Evidence from Five Mergers on the Enforcement Margin, 53 J.L. &
ECON. 417 (2010); Nathan H. Miller & Matthew C. Weinberg, Understanding the
Price Effects of the MillerCoors Joint Venture, 85 ECONOMETRICA 1763 (2017);
Ashenfelter, Hoskin & Weinberg, supra note 4 at S67.
94. Jason Furman, Chairman, Council of Econ. Advisers, Beyond Antitrust:
The Role of Competition Policy in Promoting Inclusive Growth, Searle Center
Conference on Antitrust Economics and Competition Policy (Sept. 16, 2016).
95. Another part of this broader concern is the growing pattern of various
investment funds that hold substantial stakes on competing firms which appears to deter
further vigorous competition. See Einer Elauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 129 HARV.
L. REv. 1267 (2016). While this is an additional source of concern, it is beyond the
scope of this Article.
96. Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of
Mergers on Market Power and Efficiency 3 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working




productive plants.98 It should be noted that this study included many
acquisitions that would not have been subject to challenge under even
the strictest of merger standards.
Still another contemporary study has shown that markups above
marginal cost were relatively stable in the period from 1950 to 1980,
which encompasses the era of active merger enforcement. 99 But starting
around 1980, margins have risen from an average of eighteen percent
to sixty-seven percent.' The authors find that these changes in market
power and its exploitation have adverse effects on wages and
participation in the work force as well as slowing the growth of
aggregate output. 101
Industry specific examples of the failure of merger enforcement to
preserve competition provide additional illustrations. For example, a
series of mergers have consolidated the airline industry, reducing from
six to three the number of full-line ("legacy") airlines as well as
combining the two largest discount airlines, Southwest and AirTran.1 0 2
In most of these transactions the government obtained some modest
divestiture of access to congested airports, but, of course, there were
fewer and fewer potential buyers of the rights as the industry
consolidated. 103 The most recent merger involved American Airlines
and US Airways. 10 4 After that merger, airline fares continued to
increase, and the quantity of service declined further.' It even appears
possible that the merger was allowed despite the strong likelihood of
price increases to permit the industry to overcome its putative financial
problems.o6 Other scholarly studies confirm that airfares have
98. Id. at 4-5.
99. See Jan De Loecker & Jan Eeckhout, The Rise of Market Power and the
Macroeconomic Implications 2 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
23687, 2017).
100. Id. at 9.
101. Id. at 17-31
102. FIONA ScoTT MORTON, R. CRAIG ROMAINE & SPENCER GRAFF, BENEFITS




103. Id. at 41-42.
104. Id. at 34-35.
105. Id. at 45-52 (substantial increase in airfares following the American
Airlines merger with US Airways as well as overall evidence of increased margins
resulting from higher prices and decreasing costs such as fuel).
106. Former Attorney General Holder reportedly stated in an interview that
the airline mergers were allowed because, according to the report of the interview:
"The airline sector's financial problems made consolidation in the industry necessary."
See Paul Guniganti, Holder: Airline Woes Necessitated Mergers, GLOB. COMPETITION
REV. (July 7, 2015), http://globalcompetitionreview.com/news/article/39021/holder-
airline-woes-necessitated-mergers/ [https://perma.cc/U55V-QH5W]. This implies an
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increased significantly as a result of increased concentration in the
industry.1 17 In 2016, a federal judge upheld a class action complaint
charging collusion among the four surviving airlines.os With only four
major competitors now including Southwest the erstwhile discount
airline, the court found the allegations of output fixing to be
plausible.109
There are also examples of the failure of the enforcement agencies
even to challenge mergers that dramatically increased concentration.
The Whirlpool-Maytag merger created massive market shares in
American production and sale of various white goods, but was
supposed to improve efficiency and be constrained by large buyers and
the threat of imports. 10 An after-the-fact investigation failed to show
much, if any, efficiency gain and a non-trivial increase in prices."'
Worse, one may well argue that the effect of the -merger was to limit
awareness that the result of such consolidation would probably be an increase in prices
to travelers in order to remedy the "financial problems" of the airlines. If this is in fact
the explanation for these decisions, it is an unfortunate distortion of antitrust policy.
107. See, e.g., Craig Peters, Evaluating the Performance of Merger
Simulation: Evidence from the U.S. Airline Industry, 49 J.L. & EcON. 627 (2006)
(study of six airline mergers showing average post-merger price increases of eight
percent to thirty percent); Jan Brueckner, Darin Lee & Ethan Singer, Airline
Competition and Domestic U.S. Airfares: A Comprehensive Reappraisal, 2 EcON.
TRANS. 1 (2013) (empirical data show that price competition among legacy carriers is
weak, but low cost airlines do stimulate price competition); John E. Kwoka, Jr.,
Phillippe Alepin & Kevin Hearle, Segmented Competition in Airlines: The Changing
Roles of Low-Cost and Legacy Carriers in Fare Determination (Feb. 6, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), ssrn.com/abstract=2212860 [https://perma.cc/5D5D-Y3T6]
(finding competition among legacy carriers weak and prices high unless there is
competition from low cost carriers). The combination of Southwest and AirTran
resulted in increased fares on the routes where they competed with the largest increases
in those markets where they had the largest share, but the merger also resulted in
significantly higher fares in the markets from which the merged firm withdrew as well
as in the markets where AirTran had been a potential competitor of Southwest. Pukar
KC, Higher Together: Price and Welfare Effects of a Merger Between Two Low Cost
Carriers 10-12 (Aug. 14, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3235042
[https://perma.cc/4Q6G-CL8N].
108. In re Domestic Airline Travel Antitrust Litig., 221 F. Supp. 3d 46
(D.D.C. 2016).
109. Id. at 74.
110. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Department of Justice Antitrust
Division Statement on the Closing of Its Investigation of Whirlpool's Acquisition of
Maytag (Mar. 29, 2006),
http://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/pressreleases/2006/215326.htm
[https://perma.cc/F87A-PTZ8].
111. Orley C. Ashenfelter, Daniel S. Hosken & Matthew C. Weinberg, The
Price Effects of a Large Merger of Manufacturers: A Case Study of Maytag-Whirlpool,
5 AM. EcON. J.: ECON. POLICY 239 (2013); see also Ashenfelter & Hosken, supra note
93, at 425 n.18.
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innovation by American producers as the most noticeable advances in
washing machines, dryers, and refrigerators have all come from foreign
producers. 1 12
In the dairy industry, the Justice Department allowed Dean and
Suiza to merge without formal objection because the parties committed
themselves to divesting a number of processing plants.1 13 Those plants
went to National Dairy Holdings which was fifty percent owned by
Dairy Farmers of America (DFA) that also had an exclusive supply
contract with Suiza-Dean.' 14 The Justice Department's internal
evaluation predicted that the merger would nevertheless result in a 2.5
percent price increase for fluid milk." 5 Thus, the predicted effect of the
merger was to increase prices to consumers without any identifiable
improvement in efficiency. Worse, in subsequent litigation, the
plaintiffs' expert estimated that the result of the Dean-Suiza-DFA-
National Dairy Holdings relationship was a substantially greater
increase in the price of milk-7.9 percent.' 16
Similar results exist with respect to consequences of combinations
in the American beer industry." 7 Indeed, in challenging Anheuser-
Busch's proposed acquisition of the Model brewery business, the
Justice Department highlighted the existing pattern of interdependent
pricing that had emerged in that industry."'
Some recent court decisions have suggested that the government
has the burden of establishing that an adverse effect on competition is
going to occur within a short time frame.119 In another case, despite
clear evidence that the merging firms were major competitors and that
112. See, e.g., Jessica Migala, The Hottest Home Innovations for 2017, GOOD
HOUSEKEEPING (Aug. 30, 2016),
https://www.goodhousekeeping.com/home/a40109/home-innovations-2017/
[https://perma.cc/Y87Y-MBZ6] (the only major new appliance innovations listed came
from Samsung (refrigerator) and LG (washing machine); both companies are based in
Korea).
113. In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 268-69 (6th Cir. 2014).
114. Id. at 269.
115. Id. at 285.
116. Id. at 284.
117. See Miller & Weinberg, supra note 93, at 1770-71, 1788.
118. See Complaint at 3-6, 8, United States v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV
(filed Jan. 31, 2013), https://www.justice.gov/atr/case-document/file/486606/download
[https://perma.cc/Y8E6-M4AG].
119. See, e.g., FTC v. Arch Coal Inc., 329 F. Supp. 2d 109, 132 (D.D.C.
2004). Ironically, post-merger evidence suggests that despite the judge's conclusion that
no adverse price effects would occur, prices for coal in fact increased. See Patrick
DeGraba, Coordinated Effects and Standards of Proof: The Arch Coal Merger, in THE
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 89, 109-13 (John Kwoka & Lawrence White eds., Oxford
Univ. Press 5th ed. 2009) (a rail line outage may have contributed to these price
effects, but the observed prices seem inconsistent with that as the primary explanation
for higher prices).
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no other substantial competitor currently served a substantial set of
customers, the court refused to enjoin the merger because it speculated
that new competition would emerge although there was no direct
evidence that such entry was imminent.1 20
For our purposes, however, it matters little whether the failure to
implement the incipiency doctrine comes from the enforcers, the courts,
or both. The only thing that matters is that the incipiency doctrine is not
being utilized sufficiently.
III. WHY THE INCIPIENCY DOCTRINE MAKES SENSE: IN A WORLD OF
UNCERTAINTY IT ENSURES THE "REDUNDANCY" NECESSARY TO
PRESERVE VIGOROUS COMPETITION
Even if market structure were all that mattered in contemporary
merger enforcement,1 2 1 it would be impossible to specify precisely
which mergers to block. Even under this simplifying assumption there
is no scientific basis for concluding, for example, that we should block
all mergers among X "significant" (whatever this means) firms to
ensure a market structure of at least N significant firms. Similarly, no
provable formula shows that the law should disallow any merger
resulting in an HHI increase of A points, in a market with a post-
merger level of more than B points.1 22 Both courts and agencies lack the
information necessary to derive these numbers with rigor or
confidence. The best we can do is to describe the relationships that are
relevant to this determination in a broad fashion, and to identify the
range of values that might, under a variety of specified circumstances,
be applicable. 1 23 These factors include the relationship between industry
120. United States v. Oracle Corp., 331 F. Supp. 2d 1098, 1160 (N.D. Cal.
2004).
121. Of course, many additional factors are relevant to merger enforcement
decisions. See 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 2-3. However, Dr. Malcolm
Coate demonstrated that if all one knows is market definition and the industry's
structure, one can predict the FTC's enforcement decision correctly eighty percent of
the time. See Malcolm Coate, The Merger Review Process at the Federal Trade
Commission from 1989 to 2016 (Feb. 28, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://ssrn.com/abstract= 2955987 [https://perma.cc/NS43-GGLT]. Professor Kwoka
has concluded that indeed market share and market concentration data do provide a
very good prediction of the mergers that should be stopped. See John Kwoka, The
Structural Presumption and the Safe Harbor in Merger Review: False Positives, or
Unwarranted Concerns?, 81 ANTITRUST L.J. 837, 872 (2017).
122. For an explanation of the Herfindahl index (HHI), see 2010 MERGER
GUIDELINES, supra note 8, at 18-19.
123. Kwoka, supra note 121, at 864-65, also reports that he found evidence
that some mergers in markets with low concentration had also resulted in price
increases. This is consistent with the findings of Blonigen & Pierce, supra note 96, at
3, that acquisitions of plants generally resulted in higher prices.
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
structure and profitability or price, the relationship between industry
structure and innovation, and the conditions under which mergers lead
to significant efficiencies.
Thus, the argument for "redundancy" rests upon the impossibility
of exact, precise prediction of future market behavior. The evidence
summarized in the preceding Section demonstrates that what agencies
and courts assumed to be a sufficient N to preserve workable
competition has frequently failed to achieve that goal. The implication
is that either the N itself was too low or the dynamics of the market
were such that an N that was barely sufficient at the moment proved
inadequate over time. Whichever explanation is correct, the key to
maintaining workably competitive markets is to recognize that a larger
N, or that N + X, substantial competitors are required to maintain
workably competitive markets.
The very uncertainty of the relationship between concentration and
competition provides further support for a strong definition of
incipiency. But to justify a strict standard to control mergers among
substantial firms, it is essential to assess the nature and scope of any
risks to economic efficiency and innovation that such a standard could
create. Basically, the evidence on balance demonstrates that there is no
justification for the concern that a strong policy of protecting
competition is likely to result in any cognizable harm to either
efficiency or innovation. The following sections set forth in more detail
the empirical basis for employing an incipiency standard which blocks
mergers that "may" cause competitive harm, and the reasons why there
is little risk of adverse effect on efficiency or innovation from such a
standard.
A. High Concentration Can Lead to Harm to Competition, but the
Relationship between Concentration and Competition Is Uncertain, with
a Range of Possibilities24
The existence of "redundant" competition reduces concentration,
and empirical evidence shows that concentrated markets tend to have
higher prices than un-concentrated markets, even if the firms in these
markets do not have higher profits. 125 This provides support for a
124. This section is based upon Carstensen, supra note 58, at 242-65.
125. See Ashenfelter, Hosken & Weinberg, supra note 4. Other examples of
this work include KWOKA, supra note 4; and a set of studies collected in
CONCENTRATION AND PRICE (Leonard W. Weiss ed., 1989) and summarized in the
conclusion of that volume. See Leonard W. Weiss, Conclusions, in CONCENTRATION
AND PRICE, at 266-83 (Leonard W. Weiss ed., 1989) (summarizing the results from the
studies in concluding that majority of economic studies find significant positive
relationship between concentration and price). See also, Blonigen & Pierce, supra note
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broader policy of presumptive illegality for all mergers that would
result in substantial increases in concentration. 126 The mechanisms that
produce this result appear varied and not well defined. 127
Philadelphia National Bank1 28 based its presumption against
mergers that increased concentration on a, substantial economic
literature that purported to find that concentration was related to
increased profitability. 129 The counter-argument associated with Robert
Bork and the Chicago School is that oligopolistic market structure as
such has no necessary relationship to competitive effects.130 This line of
work focused primarily on rebutting the earlier hypothesis that profits
were correlated with concentration. Professor Demsetz is frequently
credited with disproving the reliability of any correlation between
96 (plant level study shows that acquisition results in increased prices but no
productivity gains).
126. There is a vast literature on this subject. For a cogent summary
supporting the position that economic analysis supports the Philadelphia National Bank
presumption, see Steven C. Salop, The Evolution and Vitality of Merger Presumptions:
A Decision Theoretic Approach, 80 ANTITRUST L.J. 269, 276-78 (2015). For a view
that is in many respects the opposite, see Ginsburg & Wright, supra note 10.
127. Some scholars have in fact argued that the lack of a strong theoretical
explanation for the relationship calls into question the validity of the findings. STEPHEN
MARTIN, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 220 (2d ed. 2002) ("Econometric studies
of structure-conduct-price relationships are a valuable addition to . . . evidence on
structure-conduct-performance relationships. . . . But . . . it seems doubtful that
structure-conduct-price studies rest on a firmer theoretical or empirical foundation than
structure-conduct-profitability studies."). See also Daniel P. O'Brien, Price-
Concentration Analysis: Ending the Myth, and Moving Forward (July 24, 2017)
(unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3008326
[https://perma.cc/G5QC-5KQB] (contending that economic theory rejects the
plausibility of any general reliability to empirical work based on price-concentration
relationships).
Whether the causes are interdependence among dominant firms, unilateral
capacity for the merged firms to exploit market power, or enhanced barriers to entry,
or some combination of factors, the end result is a substantial probability of higher
prices. Moreover, undoing such concentration by new entry or expansion by marginal
competitors often has proven of minimal significance despite the theoretical appeal of
the contested markets hypothesis. See WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR & ROBERT
D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 4-8
(1982).
128. United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321 (1963).
129. See, e.g., Joe S. Bain, Relation of Profit Rate to Industry Concentration:
American Manufacturing, 1936-1940, 65 Q. J. ECON. 293 (1951).
130. ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 174-76, 221 (1978). Chicago
School scholars are not in complete agreement. See, e.g., RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST
LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 112 (1976) (stating that mergers in markets with four
firm concentration above sixty percent, i.e., an HHI above 900 assuming equal sized
firms, should be presumed illegal). See also RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW
132-33 (2d ed. 2001).
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profits and concentration in a paper at a 1973 conference. 13 1 But at that
same conference, Professor Weiss pointed out forcefully that the theory
predicted that prices not profits would be higher in concentrated
markets.13 2
In 1990, Weiss collected more than 121 studies that examined in
various ways the difference in prices based on levels of concentration.
His conclusion was that "our evidence that concentration is correlated
with price is overwhelming. "133 Other studies also find evidence of a
positive relationship between price and concentration.' 34 The price
effect of concentration exists regardless of the level of profitability of
the firms in the concentrated market. Such firms are likely, inter alia,
131. See Harold Demsetz, Two Systems of Belief About Monopoly, in
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING 164 (Harvey J. Goldschmid et al.
eds., 1974); see also Sam Peltzman, The Gains and Losses from Industrial
Concentration, 20 J.L. & EcON. 229 (1977). See generally JOHN S. McGEE, IN
DEFENSE OF INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION (1971). Proponents of this position argue that
the prior literature "foundered primarily on empirical evidence" showing that even if
there is a correlation between concentration and profits, the evidence suggests that the
reason is the firms in concentrated industries are "more efficient" rather than that they
are using "market power" to charge "higher prices." See Timothy J. Muris, Economics
and Antitrust, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 303, 305 (1997).
132. Leonard Weiss, The Concentration-Profits Relationship and Antitrust, in
INDUSTRIAL CONCENTRATION: THE NEw LEARNING, supra note 131, at 184, 193 ("The
unequivocal prediction is that price will be high relative to marginal cost."). MARTIN,
supra note 127, at 220-21, contends that profits and price should have a consistent
relationship, but he provides no theoretical or empirical basis for that assertion, which
was exactly what Demsetz disputed.
133. Weiss, supra note 125, at 283. Weiss found that 62.8 percent of the 121
studies showed significant positive price effects resulting from concentration and
another 24.8 percent has non-significant positive effects. Id. at 267 tbl. 13.1. Only 3.3
percent of the studies had significant negative correlations of price and concentration
while another 9.1 percent had non-significant negative effects. Id.; see also Giulio




134. See, e.g., Richard Schmalensee, Inter-Industry Studies of Structure and
Performance, in 2 HANDBOOK OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 951, 988 (Richard
Schmalensee & Robert Willig eds., 1989) ("In cross-section comparisons involving
markets in the same industry, seller concentration is positively related to the level of
price."); Timothy F. Bresnahan & Valerie Y. Suslow, Oligopoly Pricing with Capacity
Constraints, 15/16 ANNALES D'ECONOMIE ET DE STATISIQUE 267, 284 (1989)
(concentration affected price "strongly" during periods of slack demand resulting in
significantly higher prices during those years when concentration was at its highest);
MARTIN, supra note 127, at 217-20 (reports several additional studies with the same
result that concentration and price are correlated). See also Jonathan B. Baker,
Econometric Analysis in FTC v. Staples, 18 J. PUB. POL'Y & MKTG. 11, 14-16 (1999)
(predicting price effects of proposed merger); Blonigen & Pierce, supra note 96 at 3
("[tihe increase in markups for acquired plants . . . ranges from 15 percent to over 50
percent . . ." when compared to the average change for plants not acquired).
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to expend resources to protect and entrench a market position. 3 1
Essentially, once a firm faces a unique demand situation (monopolistic
competition) or is part of a relatively tight oligopoly with mutual
interests, economic logic dictates that such a firm should invest in
preserving and protecting its competitive advantage regardless of
whether the investment enhances efficiency or innovation. 136 Indeed,
such firms logically would resist efficiency improvements or
innovations that reduced the barriers to entry or otherwise encouraged
more competition. These incentives explain in part why mergers
creating such market structures are inherently likely to have
anticompetitive consequences. Hovenkamp and Shapiro in 2017
reviewed the economic literature and concluded that it showed that
"concentrated industries tended to perform poorly in serving
consumers, as they displayed higher prices, higher price/cost margins,
and higher profits than less concentrated industries."1 3 7 Thus they
concluded that "[flirst and foremost, economic theory and a wide range
of economic evidence support the conclusion that horizontal mergers
that significantly increase market concentration are likely to lessen
competition and harm consumers."l38
Thus, increased concentration has a strong relationship with higher
prices as well as facilitating other harms to competition, and it lacks a
consistent connection to reported profits. 139 Hence, any merger that
substantially increases concentration of even a moderately concentrated
market or significantly further entrenches a concentrated market is
sufficiently likely to cause a "substantial lessening of competition" or
tend "to create a monopoly" that it should be presumed illegal.140 Thus,
apparent redundancy in fact contributes directly to enhanced
competitiveness. How strong that presumption should be and what
might rebut it arguably depends on whether there are good reasons to
believe that such mergers, despite the competitive harms that they seem
likely to engender, make some other useful contribution to the
135. Richard Posner, The Social Costs of Monopoly and Regulation, 83 J.
POL. EcON. 807, 811 (1975).
136. See id. (arguing that monopolists will expend almost all of their potential
gains to avoid competition, thus eliminating all or most monopoly profits).
137. Herbert Hovenkamp & Carl Shapiro, Horizontal Mergers, Market
Structure, and Burdens of Proof, 127 YALE L.J. 1996, 2001 (2018).
138. Id. at 2006.
139. There is also evidence that where the same investors hold significant
stakes in competing firms, thereby creating a kind of concentration by interdependence,
the result is again higher prices. See Jos6 Azar, Martin C. Schmalz & Isabel Tecu,
Anti-Competitive Effects of Common Ownership, 73 J. FIN. 1513 (2018). See also Einer
Elhauge, Horizontal Shareholding, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1267 (2016).
140. See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
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economy. The next two subsections address the claims that
concentration can stimulate innovation or ensure greater efficiency.
B. The Relationship between Concentration and Innovation
What market structures are most conducive to high levels of
innovation? The conventional view long had been that the relationship
between innovation and concentration was that of an inverted U, with
both monopolies and competitive markets innovating less than
oligopolies.141 More recent empirical scholarship has, however, shown
that more competitive markets usually result in more innovation, and
that "the exercise of market power tends to slow innovation and
productivity improvements in the affected markets." 4 2 Generally,
141. CHRISTINA BOHANNAN & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, CREATION WITHOUT
RESTRAINT: PROMOTING LIBERTY AND RIVALRY IN INNOVATION 8-11 (2012).
142. Jonathan B. Baker, Market Power in the U.S. Economy Today, WASH.
CTR. FOR EQUITABLE GROWTH, Mar. 20, 2017, at 9,
http://equitablegrowth.org/research-analysis/market-power-in-the-u-s-economy-today/
[https://perma.cc/P392-D3MV]. For a summary of the literature see id. at 9, 15 nn.57-
58. Professor Baker explains this new learning:
The modem Schumpeterian growth literature concludes that greater
product-market competition fosters R&D investment by all firms in sectors
where the firms operate at the same technological level, and suggests that in
the event that product markets were to grow more competitive, the
innovation incentives of a dominant firm with a technological lead would
remain high.
Id. at 9 n.57 (citing Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the
Bull's Eye?, in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED 361, 372-
74 (Josh Lerner & Scott Stem eds., 2012)).
As Professor Baker notes:
At one time, empirical economists who studied the question thought that
some market power but not extensive market power would be best for
innovation, based on cross-industry studies that found an "inverted-U"
relationship between market concentration. But those studies did not
successfully control for differences in technological opportunity across
industries.
Id. at 15 n.58. To support his conclusion Professor Baker provides the following:
See Wesley M. Cohen, Fifty Years of Empirical Studies of Innovative
Activity and Performance, 1 HANDBOOK OF THE ECONOMICS OF INNOVATION
129, 146-48, 154-55 (Bronwyn H. Hall & Nathan Rosenberg eds., 2010);
Carl Shapiro, Competition and Innovation: Did Arrow Hit the Bull's Eye?,
in THE RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY REVISITED 361, 380
(Josh Lerner & Scott Stern eds., 2012). In some studies, the technological
opportunity problem is addressed by evaluating the innovation effects of
competition within an industry over time. E.g., Eric W.
Zitzewitz, Competition and Long-Run Productivity Growth in the U.K. and
U.S. Tobacco Industries, 1879-1939, 51 J. INDUs. EcON. 1 (2003) (finding
that competition spurred innovation).
2018:783 Merger Incipiency Doctrine 813
stimulus for innovation comes from preserving a wide range of private
efforts to innovate. It is extremely difficult to determine a priori which
innovation will be successful and which will prove a failure. 143 Thus, it
is vital to continue to have many options being explored and developed
at the same time. The more centralized decision-making about
innovation the greater is the probability that the paths pursued will be
limited and focused on those some bureaucracy has selected as
promising. Presumptions in this context are particularly relevant
because of the very uncertainty of how the dynamics of markets will
play out. For example, some enforcement authorities, concerned with
such dynamic competition, have implicitly recognized, the need to
maintain a larger group of competitors in "innovation markets" such as
pharmaceuticals, 1" because "innovation suffers when drug companies
merge."145 Contemporary enforcement recognizes that dynamic risks
Id. For an older survey finding no losses in innovation from mergers see DENNIS W.
CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 29 (4th ed.
2005).
143. Some argue that the difficulty of making predictions about innovation
means that these dynamic issues should not be the basis for merger enforcement
decisions. See, e.g., Richard T. Rapp, The Misapplication of the Innovation Market
Approach to Merger Analysis, 64 ANTITRUST L.J. 19 (1995).
144. Pinar Karacan, Comparative Study on the "Substantive Horizontal Merger
Law" Between the United States and the European Union: The History of Doctrinal
Convergence, Divergence and Parallelism 250 (2003) (unpublished SJD dissertation,
University of Wisconsin) (on file with Peter C. Carstensen, University of Wisconsin
Law School) (compared to the European Union, the United States requires a greater
minimum number of competitors in innovation markets and generally seems to require
at least four such competitors).
145. Justus Haucap & Joel Stiebale, Research: Innovation Suffers When Drug
Companies Merge, HARV. Bus. REV. (Aug. 3, 2016), https://hbr.org/2016/08/research-
innovation-suffers-when-drug-companies-merge [https://perma.cc/XV5X-4UBC].
Unfortunately, our recent research shows that antitrust authorities have been
too lenient, at least when it comes to drug company mergers. We find that
regulators have been overlooking how these mergers reduce innovation and
research and development at the merging firms. That's not the only thing
regulators are largely ignoring. These mergers are also having a sizable
negative impact on innovation and R&D at the combined firm's rivals. It's
not unexpected that merging companies reduce their R&D spending
following a merger. That may be due to the cost savings of pooling efforts
and combining their labs. Research has shown that pharma mergers reduce
innovation. But what's surpising [sic] and troubling is that our new evidence
shows that the merging companies' competitors also spend less on R&D
after the merger. Hence, industry competition and innovation become less
dynamic overall. To be more precise, we analyzed 65 pharma mergers that
were all scrutinized, but eventually approved, by the European Commission
and also other jurisdictions. We wanted to know measurements of
innovation (such as R&D spending and resulting patents) change after a
merger for both the merging parties and for their rivals. What makes our
study unique is that we compared firms' innovation activities not only
before and after acquisitions, but we also compared those merging
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exist when the number of competitors is limited. Moreover, the very
uncertainties inherent in the process of innovation argue strongly for
retaining a large number of potential innovators as an essential element
in preserving and enhancing future competition.
Thus, the old saw that necessity is the mother of invention seems
to have real empirical validity. Greater competition-not greater market
power-generally enhances the prospects for innovation and the
exercise of market power tends to slow innovation and productivity
improvements in the affected markets. Hence what may look like
redundancy is what ensures that a greater range of innovation will
occur. For this reason, if the courts were to implement a vigorous
merger incipiency policy, as Congress intended, this would be likely to
lead to an increase in innovation, not a decrease. As Professor Kwoka's
review of the literature demonstrated:
Overall, the careful economic studies in the literature as well
as other relevant evidence do not support the proposition that
industry consolidation results in more R&D or greater R&D
efficiency. In fact, there is evidence that in the best of these
studies that suggests that these mergers may adversely affect
R&D or R&D productivity.146
C. Large Mergers Are Unlikely to Produce Significant Efficiencies
There is a general perception among many, perhaps most,
members of the antitrust community that mergers between large
competing corporations typically yield substantial positive
efficiencies.147 One strand of this belief, reflected in the changing tone
companies to firms in similar pharmaceutical markets without merger
activities. Our results very clearly show that R&D and patenting within
the merged entity decline substantially after a merger, compared to the same
activity in both companies beforehand. Then we applied a market analysis,
the same one used by the European Union in its models, to analyze how the
rivals of the merging firms change their innovation activities afterward. On
average, patenting and R&D expenditures of non-merging competitors also
fell-by more than 20%-within four years after a merger. Therefore,
pharmaceutical mergers seem to substantially reduce innovation activities in
the relevant market as a whole.
Id.
146. See John Kwoka, The Effects of Mergers on Innovation: Economic
Framework and Empirical Evidence 30 (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the
authors).
147. For a recent example, see the remarks of AAG Makan Delrahim.
Competition Policy Int'l, US: Antitrust Chief Says Tech Dealmaking Spawns 'Great
Efficiencies', COMPETITION POL'Y INT'L (July 12, 2018),
https://www.competitionpolicyinternational.com/us-antitrust-chief-says-tech-
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of the merger guidelines, is that such combinations, even when each of
the firms has a substantial share of the market in both absolute and
dealmaking-spawns-great-efficiencies/ [https://perma.cc/BC98-YKYT]. See also the
following remarks by (then) FTC Chairs or AAGs for Antitrust:
J. Paul McGrath (AAG in 1984): "Recognizing the substantial benefits of
mergers, antitrust enforcement agencies and the courts now interfere only with those
mergers and acquisitions that threaten to facilitate collusion among competitors." J.
Paul McGrath, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Current Trends in Antitrust
Policy and Their Effect on Small Business, Remarks before the Small Business
Legislative Council 3-4 (Jan. 1, 1984).
Daniel Oliver (1986-90): "Mergers and acquisitions allow assets to be
reorganized efficiently, and improve consumer welfare by reducing costs and prices."
Daniel Oliver, Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement at the House Oversight
Hearings on Mergers and Acquisitions before the Subcommittee on Transportation,
Tourism, and 'Hazardous Materials Committee on Energy and Commerce (Aug. 6,
1987),
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public statements/692421/19870806 olive
r statement ibefore the subcommitteeontransportation tourism andhazardousmate
rials.pdf [https://perma.cc/2LNB-CEUG].
Robert Pitofsky (1995-2001): "Today's mergers are more likely to be motivated
by fundamental developments in the rapidly changing economy and reflect more
traditional corporate goals of efficiency and competitiveness." Robert Pitofsky,
Chairman, Fed. Trade Comm'n, Statement before the Committee on the Judiciary
United States Senate Concerning Mergers and Corporate Consolidation in the New





The vast majority of these [merger] filings involve mergers that do not
threaten harm to competition and may bring affirmative benefits for
consumers. Accordingly, we place a high priority on identifying those
relatively few mergers that might threaten harm to competition as quickly as
possible and on closing our reviews of the others as expeditiously and as
efficiently as possible.
Thomas 0. Barnett, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Perspectives on Cartel
Enforcement in the United States and Brazil at the University of Sao Paulo (Apr. 28,
2008), https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/perspectives-cartel-enforcement-united-
states-and-brazil [https://perma.cc/V5H3-GYS3].
Charles James (2001-02): "Over the decades, we have found that the vast
majority of transactions we have reviewed are pro-competitive or competitively
neutral." Charles James, Assistant Attorney Gen., Guiding Principles and
Recommended Practices for Merger Notification (Sept. 29, 2002),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/guiding-principles-and-recommended-practices-
merger-notification-and-review [https://perma.cc/88EJ-WEU7].
Joel Klein (1996-2000): "Most mergers are undoubtedly competitively benign or
even procompetitive." Joel I. Klein, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div., Making
the Transition from Regulation to Competition: Thinking About Merger Policy During
the Process of Electric Power Restructuring (Jan. 21, 1998),
https://www.justice.gov/atr/speech/making-transition-regulation-competition-thinking-
about-merger-policy-during-process [https://perma.cc/75LS-X9SN].
See also supra note 10 and accompanying text.
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relative terms, can produce significant efficiencies in the production
and distribution of goods and services. A second strand focuses on the
idea of managerial inefficiency and the market for corporate control.
The risk of takeover is thought to induce managers to behave in ways
that are economically more efficient, and this is reflected in higher
stock prices which make takeover or merger unattractive. Because large
enterprises with dispersed shareholder bases are subject to significant
agency costs, the belief emerged that mergers and acquisitions could
displace poor management replacing it with better management.
Moreover, if the underlying public market is itself "efficient" in pricing
equity, the process of merger and acquisition provides an essential
means to ensure the continued vitality of large enterprises.
But if the foregoing assumptions usually are wrong, then there are
likely to be few, if any, gains from mergers overall. The following
analysis marshals a wide range of data to challenge the validity of these
crucial assumptions. The evidence supports the conclusion by Professor
Melissa Schilling that:
Firms engage in mergers for many reasons, some of which
create value for both the firm's shareholders and society,
some that create value only for the firm's shareholders, and
some that fail even to do that. A considerable body of
research concludes that most mergers do not create value for
anyone, except perhaps the investment bankers that negotiated
the deal.148
1. THE ACTUAL RECORD OF MERGERS
Two lines of analysis suggest that mergers among substantial firms
(this is a very small fraction of the overall number of business
combinations in any year)149 do not generally result in positive
outcomes over time. First, as a matter of logic, it is unlikely that
148. Melissa Schilling, Potential Sources of Value from Mergers and Their
Indicators, ANTITRUST BULL. (forthcoming 2018),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=3168473
[https://perma.cc/BDM5-4W23]. Professor Schilling reviews the literature on page 9,
especially notes 10 and 11. Id. at 9 nn.10-11.
149. Kwoka estimates that the antitrust agencies reviewed less than one-half of
one percent of all major transactions (value over $1 million). KwoKA, supra note 4, at
9-10. Even if the number of investigations were tripled, that would still mean that 98.5
percent out of an average of 10,000 such transactions a year would not be subject to
any antitrust inquiry. See id. at 9, 10 ("[S]ince the number of mergers reported to the
antitrust agencies is less than 15 percent of enumerated large mergers during this
period, it follows that investigation were undertaken in less than one-half of 1 percent
of this total of large mergers during this period.").
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mergers among major market competitors will significantly affect
economies of scale or scope. Empirical studies provide significant
support for this conclusion. Second, stock market price studies show
that the most likely result of a merger is that the surviving firm will
lose value. The remainder of this subsection elaborates on these
observations.
a. Large Firm Mergers Are Unlikely to Produce Signficant Positive
Outcomes
Mergers involving firms with market shares sufficient to trigger
enforcement under an incipiency regime almost without exception
involve firms well above the minimum efficient scale for productive
efficiency. For this reason alone it is unlikely that these combinations
often will yield significant production efficiencies. As a matter of
theory, it is certainly possible to hypothesize that scale economies
continue through a very large range of size. Williamson's analysis of
the tradeoff between market power and efficiency provides a model of
that claim. 1o But it is highly unlikely that leading firms in an industry
fit this model when they have substantial absolute sales volume. Indeed,
if Williamson's model accurately described productive reality, one
would expect pervasive monopoly in industry. But that is not the case
and indeed such a result is highly unlikely especially when production
occurs in multiple locations.
While significant economies beyond minimum efficient scale at the
plant level are unlikely, there is probably no "natural" limit to many
types of enterprises. Edith Penrose pointed out many years ago that the
large corporation can replicate the factories or stores it needs and can
develop a management structure that can continue to operate the
resulting behemoth.' Indeed, most large enterprises operate multiple
facilities each of which is at or above the minimum efficient scale. '52
Thus, such enterprises, even if not optimally efficient, have no cost-
based limit to their size in the way conventional price theory predicts.
Penrose's model in turn should encourage skepticism about mergers
that create or expand dominant firms. They are unlikely to create
significant efficiencies, but can increasingly dominate the market place.
150. Oliver E. Williamson, Economies as an Antitrust Defense Revisited, 125
U. PENN. L. REV. 699 (1977).
151. EDITH TILDON PENROSE, THE THEORY OF THE GROWTH OF THE FIRM 55-
56, 128-29, 189-90, 198 (1959).
152. For example, in the meat packing industry, one estimate is that the level
of concentration greatly exceeded that which was necessary for efficiency, and it could
support a significantly larger number of efficient multi-plant enterprises. Peter C.
Carstensen, Concentration and the Destruction of Competition in Agricultural Markets:
The Case for Change in Public Policy, 2000 Wis. L. REV. 531, 537.
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Diversity of enterprise is itself a desirable element of a market
economy. The lack of inherent, market driven constraints on size means
that external limits are important to preserve the overall
competitiveness of the market.
b. Empirical Work on Mergers Show Few Efficiency Gains
How should efficiencies that might result from major mergers
impact the vigor or manner in which courts implement Congress's
incipiency mandate? Should the possibility of cost savings or other
productive efficiencies nudge courts in the direction of a more
permissive merger policy? No. Four principle reasons require rejection
of this contention. 153
First, almost all true efficiencies can be captured by the safe
harbors in the current Merger Guidelines and in the effective merger
enforcement standards, or by means other than mergers.'5 4
Second, it is virtually impossible to predict with relative accuracy
which mergers will cause significant efficiencies. This task is especially
difficult because the vast majority of major mergers-perhaps up to
ninety percent-result in no significant net efficiencies, or in losses (as
will be discussed in the next subsection). Moreover, those few merges
that result in efficiencies are almost impossible to identify reliably in
advance.1 5
Third, for above Guideline mergers it is incredibly difficult to
predict reliably in advance whether the efficiencies generated by any
particular merger would be likely to outweigh the probable market
power gains from that merger. The complications in doing this tradeoff
are intractable, and attempts to litigate them would unduly lower
predictability and increase uncertainty, litigation costs, and delays,
while providing no offsetting benefits. Thus, these "Type III errors"
are likely to overwhelm any marginal gain to efficiency resulting from
a more intensive inquiry into putative merger specific efficiencies.'5 6
Fourth, the best evidence suggests that, on average, mergers are
probably roughly neutral in terms of their overall effects on efficiency,
costs, and productivity.15 1 Moreover, many of the efficiencies that are
153. These and related factors are discussed in much more detail in Fisher &
Lande, supra note 11.
154. See id. at 1651-54.
155. See id. at 1654-69.
156. See id. passim.
157. The authors are grateful to Professors Dennis Carlton and Melissa
Schilling for advice concerning this topic. All of the interpretations of these studies,
however, were made by Professors Carstensen and Lande, and should not necessarily
be attributed to Professors Carlton or Schilling.
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generated by mergers are likely to result from the ninety-nine plus
percent of mergers that are of no interest to enforcers because they
involve relatively small firms or firms in unconcentrated industries.1 s8
As noted, mergers involving plant-wide efficiencies are very unlikely to
be the subject of enforcement actions. There are also a modest number
of studies showing significant positive results overall, but in general the
reported average gains are small-i.e. two percent. 159 By contrast, there
Studies, some of which evaluate hundreds of mergers, showing overall mixed or
essentially neutral overall results from mergers, depending upon a large number of
variables, include: K. P. Ramaswamy & James F. Waegelein, Firm Financial
Performance Following Mergers, 20 REv. QUANTITATIVE FIN. & AcCT. 115 (2003); P.
Raghavendra Rau & Theo Vermaelen, Glamour, Value and the Post-Acquisition
Performance of Acquiring Firms, 49 J. FIN. EcON. 223 (1998); Jerayr Haleblian &
Sydney Finkelstein, The Influence of Organizational Acquisition Experience on
Acquisition Performance: A Behavioral Learning Perspective, 44 ADMIN. ScI. Q. 29
(1999); Laurence Capron, The Long-Term Performance of Horizontal Acquisitions, 20
STRAT. MGMT. J. 987 (1999); James D. Parrino & Robert S. Harris, Takeovers,
Management Replacement, and Post-Acquisition Operating Performance: Some
Evidence from the 1980s, J. APPLIED CORP. FIN., Winter 1999, at 88; Michael L.
McDonald et al., What Do They Know? The Effects of Outside Director Acquisition
Experience on Firm Acquisition Performance, 29 STRAT. MGMT. J. 1155 (2008). See
also Bruce A. Blonigen & Justin R. Pierce, Evidence for the Effects of Mergers on
Market Power and Efficiency 1 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No.
22750, 2016), http://www.nber.org/papers/w22750 [https://perma.cclL5UM-YUFA]
("We use newly-developed techniques to separately estimate productivity and markups
across a wide range of industries using detailed plant-level data. Employing a
difference-in-differences framework, we find that M&As are associated with increases
in average markups, but find little evidence for effects on plant-level productivity. We
also examine whether M&As increase efficiency through reallocation of production to
more efficient plants or through reductions in administrative operations, but again find
little evidence for these channels, on average. The results are robust to a range of
approaches to address the endogeneity of firms' merger decisions."); Louis Kaplow &
Carl Shapiro, Antitrust, in 2 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 1073, 1154 (A.
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (summarizing event study evidence
showing that acquiring firms do not benefit from mergers on average).
158. KwoKA, supra note 4, at 10 notes that the enforcers only investigate .5
percent of mergers.
159. For a recent survey, see Dennis W. Carlton, Eugene Fama and Industrial
Organization, in THE FAMA PORTFOLIO: THE SELECTED PAPERS OF EUGENE F. FAMA
213 (John Cochrane & Tobias Moskowitz eds., 2017).
Mergers don't seem to create market power but do seem to create
efficiencies. There is an overall gain in value to the merged firm
somewhere in the range of 0-10 percent (e.g., Andrade et al. [2001] report
a 2 percent gain) above the value of the separate firms' values, and that gain
seems unrelated to market power. . . . [so] any significant toughening of
standards runs the risk of deterring efficiency-enhancing mergers.
Id. at 214. A recent study showing overall positive effects from mergers is: Keith D.
Brouthers et al., If Most Mergers Fail Why Are They So Popular, 31 LONG RANGE
PLANNING 347, 347 (1998) ("These previous studies have consistently shown that
acquiring firms do not benefit from mergers. . . . This study suggests that researchers
have been using incorrect measures of merger performance, which accounts for their
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is a very large and respectable body of findings suggesting that,
generally and overall, significant mergers lead to a smalll60 or relatively
large16 ' net negative effect on efficiency.
negative findings. The authors present a new methodology for measuring merger
performance.... The results of applying this new methodology to a small sample of
Dutch mergers indicate that mergers are extremely successful."). See also Steven N.
Kaplan, Mergers and Acquisitions: A Financial Economics Perspective, Prepared for
the Antitrust Modernization Commission Economist's Roundtable on Merger
Enforcement (Feb. 2006) (unpublished manuscript),
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/AMC/commission-hearings/PDF/kaplanstatement.pdf
[https://perma.cc/J5CM-VLPH]:
Although the evidence is not uniform, on balance I would conclude that
acquisitions create economic value. I rely on the announcement returns as
the critical evidence. They have been reliably positive over the last 30
years, particularly for acquisitions that are cash financed. Acquisitions
using stock are value neutral, but likely include a negative information
component about the stand-alone firms. It is clear that shareholders of
targets gain, while shareholders of acquirers experience mixed results. The
accounting-based studies are more mixed, but are subject to more noise.
Id. at 14. For an older survey, see CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 142, at 28-29 ("In
summary, stock market evidence supports the view that merger activity improves
efficiency and improves value. . . . Additional research on profits subsequent to
consolidation, not on stock price, is needed to confirm these efficiency gains. Without
such research, some may argue that mergers and takeovers create illusory stock market
value that represents either the unjustified transfer of wealth from those dependent on
the acquired firm . . . to its shareholders, or valuation errors by the stock market.")
(also citing to the same 2001 Andrade et al. study referenced above by Carlton, supra
note 159, at 2).
160. Studies showing overall results from mergers that are slightly negative
include: David R. King et al., Meta-Analyses of Post-Acquisition Performance:
Indications of Unidentified Moderators, 25 STRAT. MGMT. J. 187, 187 (2004) ("We
find robust results indicating that, on average and across the most commonly studied
variables, acquiring firms' performance does not positively change as a function of
their acquisition activity, and is negatively affected to a modest extent."); Aloke Ghosh,
Does Operating Performance Really Improve Following Corporate Acquisitions?, 7 J.
CORP. FIN. 151, 151 (2001) ("Previous research indicates that operating performance
improves following corporate acquisitions relative to industry-median firms. Such
performance results are likely to be biased because acquiring firms undertake
acquisitions following a period of superior performance and they are generally larger
than industry-median firms. Using firms matched on performance and size as a
benchmark, I find no evidence that operating performance improves following
acquisitions."); Vassilis M. Papadakis & Ioannis C. Thanos, Measuring the
Performance of Acquisitions: An Empirical Investigation Using Multiple Criteria, 21
BRIT. J. MGMT. 859, 859 (2010) ("Overall, results from the three measures indicate
failure rates from 50% to 60%."); Patricia M. Danzon et al., Mergers and Acquisitions
in the Pharmaceutical and Biotech Industries, 28 MANAGE. DECIS. EcoN. 307, 307
(2007) ("Controlling for merger propensity, large firms that merged experienced a
similar change in enterprise value, sales, employees, and R&D, and had slower growth
in operating profit, compared with similar firms that did not merge.").
161. Studies that show overall effects from mergers that are clearly negative
on average include: Paul Andr6 et al., The Long-Run Performance of Mergers and
Acquisitions: Evidence from the Canadian Stock Market, FIN. MGMT., Winter 2004, at
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Other empirical work is consistent with the rjection of any
general expectation that major horizontal mergers are likely to result in
increased productive efficiency. Professors Scherer and Ravenscraft
found that most mergers resulted in inefficiency. 6 2  Additional
studies,163 including studies of banking, insurance, and airlines, confirm
this result.164 Professor Kwoka found that the post-merger studies he
reviewed reported little evidence of efficiency gains.165 Thus the earlier
quoted conclusion by Judge Posner ("I wish someone would give me
some examples of mergers that have improved efficiency. There must
be some. ")166 should come as no surprise.
27, 27 (a study of 267 Canadian acquisitions shows that "acquirers significantly
underperform over the three-year post-event period."); Anup Agrawal et al., The Post-
Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-Examination of an Anomaly, 47 J. FIN.
1605, 1605 (1992) ("[U]sing a nearly exhaustive sample of mergers between NYSE
acquirers and NYSE/AMEX targets. We find that stockholders of acquiring firms
suffer a statistically significant loss of about 10% over the five-year post-merger
period, a result robust to various specifications."); Andrew P. Dickerson et al., The
Impact of Acquisitions on Company Performance: Evidence from a Large Panel of UK
Firms, 49 OXFORD ECON. PAPERS 344, 344 (1997) ("This paper investigates the impact
of acquisitions on company performance using a large panel of UK-quoted companies
observed over a long time period. The results indicate that acquisitions have a
detrimental impact on company performance and that company growth through
acquisition yields a lower rate of return than growth through internal investment.");
David J. Ravenscraft & F.M. Scherer, The Profitability of Mergers, 7 INT'L J. INDUS.
ORG. 101, 101 (1989) ("Following merger, the profitability of acquired entities
declined except among pooling-of-interests merger partners of roughly equal pre-
merger size."); Christian Tuch & Noel O'Sullivan, The Impact of Acquisitions on Firm
Performance: A Review of the Evidence, 9 INT'L J. MGMT. REVs. 141, 141 (2007)
("The evidence. suggests that, in the short run, acquisitions have at best an insignificant
impact on shareholder wealth. Long-run performance analysis reveals overwhelmingly
negative returns, while the evidence using accounting performance measures is
mixed.").
162. DAVID J. RAVENSCRAFT & F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND
EcONOMIC EFFICIENCY 194-204 (1987). Like most of these studies, this one looked at
mergers generally and did not limit its focus to the large mergers of concern to
antitrust. Id.
163. See, e.g., Ghosh, supra note 160, at 151 (finding "no evidence that
operating performance improves following acquisitions").
164. DIANA L. Moss, DELIVERING THE BENEFITS? EFFICIENCIES AND AIRLINES
MERGERS (2013), www.antitrustinstitute.org/sites/default/files/AAIUSAir-
AAEfficiencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/9DFD-UEVD]; J. David Cummins, Sharon
Tennyson & Mary A. Weiss, Consolidation and Efficiency in the US Life Insurance
Industry, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 325, 327 (1999) ("larger [life insurance] firms
generally are found to exhibit decreasing returns to sale"); Todd T. Milbourn, Arnoud
W. A. Boot & Anjan V. Thakor, Megamergers and Expanding Scope: Theories of Bank
Size and Activity Diversity, 23 J. BANKING & FIN. 195, 197, 198 (1999) (banking: "little
or no improvement in cost efficiency" and "there is also a lack of empirical evidence
that expansion of scope in banking has been beneficial").
165. KwoKA, supra note 4, at 148.
166. Philadelphia National Bank at 50, supra note 15, at 216.
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Indeed, many of the gains to the merging parties likely to be
proclaimed as "efficiency" benefits on closer analysis involve
transferring costs to third parties. 6 7 For example, when two large
retailers combine and eliminate outlets, this imposes greater travel
burdens on customers. The merged parties may have lower costs, but a
broader economic calculus could show that the total social costs of the
merger are overall neutral or even negative.168 Another false economy
comes from exploiting enhanced buyer power to drive down the price
of inputs. Such buyer power can offset an upstream oligopoly's seller
power, but it is often used to lower prices to powerless suppliers. This
is no more an efficiency than the gains to a monopolist from raising
prices to purchasers.1 69
In sum, most studies have found that mergers do not on average
increase net corporate efficiency. As Professor Schilling concluded,
"[o]verall, the evidence for mergers having negligible or negative
effects on value appears to outweigh the evidence for clearly positive or
mixed effects on value.""' Nevertheless, reasonable people can differ
167. This is ironic because the overriding goal of the antitrust laws is to
prevent wealth transfers from purchasers to firms with market power. See Robert H.
Lande, Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of Antitrust, 34
HASTINGS L.J. 65 (1982).
168. See CRAIG LAMBERT, SHADOW WORK: THE UNPAID, UNSEEN JOBS THAT
FILL YOUR DAY 15-23 (2015) (description of the many tasks that have devolved onto
individuals which were once done for them; unfortunately, the book lacks a coherent
economic model to examine these issues).
169. See Peter C. Carstensen, Buyer Power and the Horizontal Merger
Guidelines: Minor Progress on an Important Issue, 14 U. PA. Bus. L. 775, 794-95
(2012); see also David A. Domina & C. Robert Taylor, The Debilitating Effects of
Concentration Markets Affecting Agriculture, 15 DRAKE J. AGRIC. L. 61 (2010). A
study done for the United States Department of Agriculture on hog markets found that
there was significant evidence of monopsony buying power viewing the market
nationally. GIPSA, 4 LIVESTOCK AND MEAT MARKETING STUDY: HOG AND PORK
INDUSTRIES FINAL REPORT (2007),
https://www.gipsa.usda.gov/psp/publication/livemarketstudy/LMMSVol_4.pdf
[https://perma.cc/XB59-TA33]. Despite this evidence, the Department of Justice
allowed a further significant increase in national and regional concentration by
permitting Smithfield to acquire Premium Standard Brands. See Press Release,
Statement of the Department of Justice Antitrust Division on its Decision to Close its
Investigation of Smithfield Inc.'s Acquisition of Premium Standard Farms Inc. (May 4,
2007), http://www.justice.gov/archive/atr/public/press releases/2007/223077.htm
[https://perma.cc/HC6Z-4VF8]; see also Stephanie Strom, Big Food Companies Pay
Later, Squeezing Their Suppliers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2015),
https://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/07/business/big-companies-pay-later-squeezing-
their-suppliers.html (reporting major food processors use their buyer power to force
suppliers to wait much longer for payment thereby forcing the seller to finance the
buyer's operating expenses). See generally PETER C. CARSTENSEN, COMPETITION
POLICY AND THE CONTROL OF BUYER POWER: A GLOBAL ISSUE (2017).
170. Schilling, supra note 148, at 8. Professor Schilling explains these results
as follows:
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as to whether corporate mergers-even including the vast bulk of
mergers that are of no interest to enforcers-are neutral overall, or are
slightly positive or negative in terms of their average efficiency effects.
Despite differences in the results of these studies and in possible
interpretations of these results, it seems reasonable to conclude that if
courts and enforcers were to implement a merger incipiency policy
vigorously, in the manner intended by Congress, there would be no
significant overall impairment of corporate efficiency."' Hence, to the
extent enforcers and judges decide marginal cases in favor of
defendants out of concern with corporate efficiency, the conclusions of
modem scholarship demonstrates that this pro-merger bias is
inappropriate.
2. SHAREHOLDERS OF THE RESULTING FIRM OFTEN SUFFER
SIGNIFICANT LOSSES
A final basis for rejecting any general claims that mergers among
major competitors are generally desirable is that many empirical
examinations of the results for shareholders show that on average the
buyer and its investors suffer losses, not gains. In 1992, a major study
covering more than thirty years of mergers among publicly traded
companies reported that the surviving firm on average lost about ten
percent of its value over a period of five years. 17 2 Another group of
researchers reported that the acquired businesses tended to suffer
A considerable body of research has attempted to assess whether, on
average, mergers create or destroy shareholder value. Studies have used a
wide range of methodological approaches (e.g., event studies, large panel
analyses, case studies), samples (e.g., mergers in particular industries,
mergers where both the acquirer and target are US publicly held firms,
mergers that vary in the share that is taken by the acquirer), and
performance measures (e.g., stock price reactions, longrun cumulative
abnormal returns, accounting performance, productivity, patenting
outcomes). It should be clear that there are large number of parameters that
may vary in the construction of a research design to study the performance
of mergers, and, not surprisingly, the research has fallen well short of a
consensus.
Id.
171. Of course, enforcers and courts should ignore the weight of economic
scholarship if these results would cause them to ignore or override the intent of
Congress that the merger laws should embody a vigorous incipiency doctrine.
Fortunately, there is no conflict between the intent of Congress and the results of
scholarship.
172. Anup Agrawal, Jeffrey F. Jaffe & Gershon N. Mandelker, The Post-
Merger Performance of Acquiring Firms: A Re-Examination of an Anomaly, 47 J. FIN.
1605, 1605-06 (1992).
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reduced profitability and loss of market position."' In 2012 alone,
publicly held companies wrote off fifty-one billion dollars because of
bad mergers.1 74 Indeed, a comparison of successful buyers to the losing
bidder in a corporate buyout found that the buyers had worse results
over time than the unsuccessful bidders.17 1 In 2010, McKinsey
reported: "Anyone who has researched merger success rate knows that
roughly 70% of mergers fail."176 An article in the Harvard Business
Review observed that "study after study puts the failure rate for
mergers and acquisitions somewhere between 70% and 90%.""7 The
basic point being that buyers have a tendency to over pay and not to
realize the gains that they claimed to expect. Even the co-author of one
of the leading articles claiming acquisitions resulted in significant
premiums for the buyer subsequently recanted and conceded that there
were "significant negative returns . . . following a merger. .. .17
173. Dennis C. Mueller & Mark L. Sirower, The Causes of Mergers: Tests
Based on the Gains to Acquiring Firms' Shareholders and the Size of Premia, 24
MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON. 373, 374 (2003) (citing five studies "that suggest that
acquisitions significantly impair the long-term profitability or market shares of the
acquired businesses"). That study also found that there was a strong tendency to
overpay for acquisitions. Id. at 380, 388 ("several of our findings actually imply that
mergers destroy more of the value of the bidding firms than is paid as premium to the
target").
174. Emily Chasan & Maxwell Murphy, Companies Get More Wiggle Room
on Soured Deals, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 11, 2013, 8:15 PM).
www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702304868404579191940788875848 (reporting
a study by Duff & Phelps); see also Steven Lipin & Nikhil Deogun, Big Mergers of
'90s Prove Disappointing to Shareholders, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 30, 2000, 2:40 AM),
www.wsj.com/articles/SB972860303890013995 [https://perma.cc/42WE-TE58]
(reporting that Salomon Smith Barney's analysis of major mergers showed that the
acquirers "on average underperformed" measured by both the S&P 500 stock index and
their peer group); Bhushan Bahree, Pumped Up: Oil Mergers Leave Investors Gushing,
But Do They Work?-Past Deals Failed to Deliver on Great Expectations; Size Doesn't
Bring Clout-Holy Grails and Staff Cuts?, WALL ST. J. (July 22, 1999, 1:46 AM),
www.wsj.com/articles/SB932592913980475039 ("Megamergers often flop, and oil
mergers especially are prone to failure.").
175. Ulrike Malmendier, Enrico Moretti & Florian S. Peters, Winning by
Losing: Evidence on the Long-Run Effects of Mergers 20-25 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ.
Research, Working Paper No. 18024, 2012), www.nber.org/papers/wl8024
[https://perma.cc/DK6L-9SKY].




177. Clayton M. Christensen, Richard Alton, Curtis Rising & Andrew
Waldeck, The Big Idea: The New M&A Playbook, HARV. Bus. REv. (Mar. 2011), at
49.
178. Richard S. Ruback, Comment, on Means of Payment in Takeovers:
Results for the United Kingdom and the United States, in CORPORATE TAKEOVERS:
CAUSE AND CONSEQUENCES 260, 262 (Alan J. Auerbach ed., 1988) (commenting on a
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Thus, measured by stock market results most large mergers are
not in fact very helpful to the development of economic efficiency,
innovation, or other consequences that are desirable from the
perspective of the public interest. It follows that strong anti-merger
policy designed to prevent the foreseeable adverse competitive effects
of mergers between substantial competitors does not create a significant
risk of substantial loss of desirable economic outcomes.
The premise of contemporary merger policy is that merger among
firms is basically a desirable event."' Mergers' disappointing results
are, however, consistent with the repeated observation that, many
motivations for merger are largely disconnected from achieving
economic efficiency despite what the promoters may assert in securities
filings and press briefings."' The publicly held corporation faces very
substantial agency problems."' The shareholders are largely powerless
when ownership is widely dispersed. The board of directors, the agent
of the shareholders, is usually under the control of management which
in turn can shape both buying and selling decisions to serve its strategic
interests.' 8 2 Moreover, third parties, takeover funds, and legal and
financial advisers can and do reap benefits from promoting such
transactions even when the result for the enterprise is negative. Hence,
many major mergers arise from motivations unrelated to increased
efficiency. For all these reasons the purchase and sale of large
corporations does not consistently advance desirable economic results.
study covering most American mergers from 1955 to 1985 where the shareholders in
the successful buyer suffered an average seventeen percent decline in share value in the
two years following the merger). Ruback was Michael C. Jensen's co-author on The
Market for Corporate Control: The Scientific Evidence, 11 J. FIN. ECON 5 (1983) (this
article is one of the most frequently cited statements of the thesis that changes in
corporate control are efficiency enhancing and produce positive gains for both selling
shareholders and shareholders in the buyer).
179. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
180. For one ironic evaluation, compare Stanley Bing, Why We Love Mergers,
FORTUNE, Dec. 22, 2014, at 172 ("a host of articles contend [I that ... up to 70% or
80% of . . . mergers dilute value rather than build it." But the interests of bankers,
lawyers, journalists and Wall Street all drive the process so "when all the M&As have
been finished, we'll have five big companies that do everything."). See also JONATHAN
A. KNEE ET AL., THE CURSE OF THE MOGUL: WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE WORLD'S
LEADING MEDIA COMPANIES 213-17 (2009) (describing consistent over payment for
media properties).
181. This is a longstanding issue in corporate governance. See, e.g., ADOLF
A. BERLE & GARDINER C. MEANS, THE MODERN CORPORATION AND PRIVATE PROPERTY
112-16 (1932, rev. ed. 1968).
182. While restricting such combinations may reduce, at the margin, the
market price of the assets being sold, if the merger or acquisition is itself of
questionable merit as a business transaction, there should be little concern that the
overall result will have an adverse effect on either short term or long term economic
goals. Indeed, one might well argue that any reduced price moves the valuation of the
enterprise closer to some "real" value.
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This is true regardless whether one focuses on mergers' increased
prices, reduced levels of innovation, or effects on corporate efficiency.
These results should invite the enforcers and the courts to give a greater
weight to the potential negative competitive effects that might arise
when such transactions "may" eliminate substantial competition in
markets with moderate to significant concentration. These economic
results should cause courts to take Congress's incipiency mandate more
seriously.
IV. REDUNDANCY REDUCES THE PROBABILITY OF DIMINISHED
COMPETITION
The evidence is very strong that it is. hard to predict accurately
how markets will function and how competitive they will remain. The
fundamental point, however, is that redundancy will enable markets to
be more competitive despite the many events that can cause a reduction
in the number or vigor of competitors. 183 This Section examines the
implications of these possible issues to show the importance of markets
having a relatively large number (a "redundant" number) of
competitors.
A. The Role of Luck in Market Success
It is extremely difficult to predict accurately the vigor of
competition in a market, especially over time. The number and types of
almost unpredictable uncertainties are virtually limitless. 184 In part due
to luck, accident, or randomness, markets can evolve gradually, or
change quickly, from highly competitive to less competitive. Even to a
market dominated by a single firm."' There are, moreover, reasons to
183. The authors are grateful to Barry C. Lynn for many of the examples in
this section.
184. See NASSIM NICHOLAS TALEB, ANTIFRAGILE: THINGS THAT GAIN FROM
DISORDER 160 (2012). Taleb also observes that "[r]edundancy is ambiguous because it
seems like a waste if nothing unusual happens. Except that something unusual
happens-usually." Id. at 45; see also id. at 5, 23 ("We have been fragilizing the
economy, our health, political life, education, almost everything . . . by suppressing
randomness and volatility."); cf. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, FREEFALL: AMERICA, FREE
MARKETS, AND THE SINKING OF THE WORLD ECONOMY (2010).
185. This section is based upon material collected in Jorge Marcos Ramos,
Chapter 7, The Lucky Monopolist, draft of March 6, 2017, forthcoming in THE ORIGINS
OF FIRM DOMINANCE IN EU COMPETITION LAW (2018). Professor Ramos defines events
caused by luck, accident or randomness as events that
(1) are outside the knowledge of the economic actor or its ability to
determine the timing of the event; (2) do not require the firm to incur any
cost to secure their market position; they are exogenous to the cost
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believe these types of changes occur frequently enough to impact
merger policy. As Professors Scherer and Ross asked: "Why do
concentrated firm size distributions arise from initial conditions that
seemingly give each firm an equal chance? The answer, in a word, is
"luck." 186 They begin their analysis by "stating the proposition at its
baldest, most radical form: the market structures observed at any
moment in time are the result of pure historical chance."' 8  They
continue:
Contrary to what untutored intuition might advise, the firms
do not long remain equal in size and market share, even
though their growth prospects are identical ex ante . . . .
Some firms will inevitably enjoy a run of luck, experiencing
several years of rapid growth in close succession. Once the
most fortunate enterprises climb well ahead of the pack it is
difficult for laggards to rally and rectify the imbalance . . .
188
They add that even though many other factors also contribute to firm
growth, "[t]he random growth hypotheses have considerable appeal,
both because chance plainly does play a role in company growth, and
because actual firm size distributions often correspond to those
predicted by stochastic growth models." 89 Professor Demsetz similarly
wrote that luck also often plays a role in firm performance: "Superior
performance can be attributed to the combination of great uncertainty
plus luck or atypical insight by the management of a firm."1 90 Some
economists believe that, for relatively competitive markets, luck will be
the principal factor that separates "winners from near-winners. "191
Nobel laureate Oliver Williamson concluded that market dominance
functions of the firm, and (3) are meaningful enough to thrust a firm to a
position of dominance among existing firms.
Id. at 1-2.
186. F. M. SCHERER & DAVID Ross, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND
EcoNOMIC PERFORMANCE 142 (3d ed. 1990).
187. Id. at 141.
188. Id.
189. Id. at 146.
190. Harold Demsetz, Industry Structure, Market Rivalry, and Public Policy,
16 J. LAw ECON. 1, 3 (1973).
191. Richard R. Nelson & Sidney G. Winter, Forces Generating and Limiting
Concentration under Schumpeterian Competition, 9 BELL J. EcON. 524, 525 (1978).
"In our model all firms act to maximize net expected wealth and some are just "luckier"
than others." Steven A. Lippman & Richard P. Rumelt, Uncertain Imitability: An
Analysis of Interfirm Differences in Efficiency under Competition, 13 BELL J. EcON.
418, 421 (1982).
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should be presumed to be the result of a "chance event failure."1 9 2
Indeed, Professor Michael Porter, the leading business strategist of
modem times,1 9 3 even thought it important to demonstrate that luck is
not the only explanation for firm differences and growth!' 94 As Nobel
Prize recipient Jean Tirole notes, if a firm "dominates simply because
of luck of circumstance, that skews competition unfairly. "
Admittedly, it is difficult empirically to determine whether a firm,
or the vigor of competition in a market, succeeds or fails in whole or in
part because of luck, as opposed to skill. As Justice Breyer observed,
many believe that "I am skillful; you are lucky."19 ' With this caveat,
we present examples of firms that have achieved a degree of market
dominance in part though luck, accident, or randomness.
192. Oliver E. Williamson, Antitrust Enforcement and the Modern
Corporation, in 3 POLICY ISSUES AND RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES IN INDUSTRIAL
ORGANIZATION 16, 21 (Victor R. Fuchs ed., 1972). Williamson believes this
presumption is warranted unless intellectual property rights, scale, predatory behavior
or superior management claims can be supported. Id. at 16.
193. See, e.g., Geoff Colvin, There's No Quit in Michael Porter, FORTUNE
(October 29, 2012), http://fortune.com/2012/10/15/theres-no-quit-in-michael-porter/
[https://perma.cc/7XBN-WCS2] (describing Porter as "the most famous and influential
business professor who has ever lived. . . . He is widely and rightly regarded as the all-
time greatest [business] strategy guru . . . .").
194. Richard E. Caves, Bradley T. Gale & Michael E. Porter, Interfirm
Profitability Diferences: Comment, 91 Q.J. EcON. 667, 674 (1977) ("We conclude that
the evidence supports the existence of a behavioral relation between market share and
profitability for companies in concentrated industries, and that the observed statistical
relation between these variables cannot be ascribed exclusively to unobserved (and
normatively unimpeachable) variations in luck.") (foomote omitted).
195. See Robin Mordfin & Toni Shears, Regulation and Market Power,
BECKER FRIEDMAN INST. FOR ECON. U. OF CHI. (May 28, 2015),
http://bfi.uchicago.edu/news/feature-story/regulation-and-market-power
[https://perma.cc/3CJU-YWXZ]. As Justice Breyer noted:
At the least, one should not underemphasize plain luck as a way to stay on
top. Suppose you try the following game. Pair up, and flip a coin. Keep
flipping until the man who lost the first time catches up with the winner;
when he catches up, quit. Some of you will be here all night, indeed it may
be days or weeks before the room is cleared. Yet, that last player has not
used any skill, foresight or industry to stay ahead. Given the thousands of
different industries in the economy, one cannot explain dominance entirely
on the basis of superior product, superior management, or even predatory
practices.
Stephen G. Breyer, The Problem of the Honest Monopolist, 44 ANTITRUST L.J. 194,
195-96 (1975).
196. Breyer, supra note 195, at 197.
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1. COMPETITION PROBLEMS CAUSED BY OPEC1 97
The Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC)
caused an unexpected international energy crisis that affected
competition in energy markets around the world. One example involved
the oil market in the Netherlands. In British Petroleum (ABG Oil
Companies),198 the European Commission accused British Petroleum
(BP) of abusing its dominant position in the Netherlands during the
OPEC oil embargo when it "found itself in position to control
production and distribution in a substantial proportion of the market." 99
BP was the lucky beneficiary of OPEC's pricing and output
restrictions: "Such a sudden shortage, especially one that was not
brought about by economic considerations, led to a restriction of both
actual and potential competition among the small group of companies
concerned . . . ."200 Although the European Court of Justice did not
find that BP had violated competition law,201 it did not overturn the
Commission's holding that BP possessed an accidentally created
dominant position.2 0 2
2. COMPETITION PROBLEMS CAUSED BY THE FUKUSHIMA
EARTHQUAKE AND NUCLEAR ACCIDENT203
The earthquake in Fukushima, Japan affected competition in
energy markets not only in Japan, but also in Germany. As Professor
Ramos documents:
Before Fukushima, Germany had been a strong advocate of
nuclear policy. In 2012, the Fukushima accident prompted a
"sudden, unexpected and significant" decision taken by the
German government: to permanently close all the eight pre-
197. This example is based upon material found in Ramos, supra note 185, at
11-13.
198. Commission Decision IV/28.841 of 19 April 1977, ABG Oil Companies
Operating in the Netherlands, 1977 O.J. (L1 17).
199. Id. at 9.
200. Id.
201. Case 77/77, Benzine en Petroleum Handelsmaatschappij BV v. Comm'n,
1977 E.C.R. 1514, 1530.
202. Ramos, supra note 189, at 13. The case is primarily known for the
collective dominance analysis. See Pranvera Kellezi, Abuse Below the Threshold of
Dominance, in ABUSE OF DOMINANT POSITION: NEW INTERPRETATION, NEW
ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS? 55, 77 (M. 0. Mackenrodt, B. C. Gallego & S.
Enchelmaier, S. eds., 2008).
203. This example is based upon material found in Ramos, supra note 185, at
13.
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1981 nuclear plants. If the accident had not occurred the
nuclear plants would not have been closed.204
After these German nuclear plants closed the market power and prices
of remaining energy suppliers increased significantly.205
3. COMPETITION PROBLEMS CAUSED BY IMPROPER GOVERNMENT
REGULATION, INCLUDING WRONGLY GRANTED PATENTS 206
Improper government regulation can of course detrimentally affect
competition. An example of this is can be a wrongly granted patent,
which could unfairly place the lucky recipient in a position of
dominance. Professor Ramos illustrates this point using the case of
Windsurfing International,20 7 which negotiated licensing agreements for
patented items that prevented the licensees from challenging the validity
of the licensed patents. 208 The European Commission decided that the
no-challenge clauses prevented licensees from removing "wrongly
201granted monopolies" caused by the patents. On appeal the European
Court of Justice upheld the Commission's finding, and held that it is in
the public interest to eliminate "patents granted in error." 2 10
B. Market Fragility and Vulnerability211
As Barry Lynn and others have shown, market-wide problems
caused by luck, accident, or randomness with the potential to affect
consumers are especially likely to arise when markets are unduly
204. Id. (citing Luigi Grossi, Sven Heim & Michael Waterson, A Vision of the
European Energy Future? The Impact of the German Response to the Fukushima
Earthquake 1 (Centre for European Economic Research (ZEW), Discussion Paper No.
14-051, July 2014)).
205. The Residual Supply Index indicates the degree of market power and
accounts for the dynamics of the demand side. Id. at 13 (citing Grossi, Heim &
Waterson, supra note 204, at 16, 18-22.).
206. This example is based upon material found in Ramos, supra note 185, at
13-15.
207. Commission Decision IV/29.395 of 11 July 1983, Windsurfing Int'l, 1983
O.J. (L229).
208. Ramos, supra note 189, at 14.
209. Windsurfing Int'l, 1983 O.J. (L229) at 15. See also Case 193/83,
Windsurfing Int'l v. Comm'n, 1986 E.C.R. 643, 663 ("[T]he public interest in ensuring
an essentially free system of competition and therefore in the removal of a monopoly
perhaps wrongly granted to the licensor must prevail over any other consideration.").
210. Windsurfing Int'l, 1986 E.C.R. at 663. For several additional similar
examples see Ramos, supra note 185, at 14.
211. This section relies heavily upon Yossi Sheffi & Barry C. Lynn, Systemic
Supply Chain Risk, THE BRIDGE, Fall 2014, at 22.
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fragile.2 12 An unduly fragile market is more vulnerable to the vagaries
of luck, including natural disasters and unexpected bankruptcy.2 13 These
markets especially are in need of the useful redundancy that can result
from a strict anti-merger policy. Markets can be unduly fragile for a
large number of reasons.
1. FRAGILITY CAUSED BY INTERDEPENDENT SUPPLY CHAINS
The U.S. auto industry is today highly interdependent due to auto
firms' common supply chain.214 Indeed, in 2008, when the bankruptcy
of General Motors seemed imminent, the CEO of Ford, Alan Mulally,
in testimony before the Senate Banking Committee told Congress about
the disasters likely to occur if Ford's traditional rival was allowed to go
bankrupt:
It any one of the domestic companies should fail . . . there is
a strong chance that the entire industry would face severe
disruption. Ours is in some significant ways an industry that is
uniquely interdependent-particularly with respect to our
supply base, with more than 90 percent commonality among
our suppliers. Should one of the other domestic companies
declare bankruptcy, the effect on Ford's production operations
would be felt within days-if not hours. Suppliers could not
get financing and would stop shipments to customers. Without
parts for the just-in-time inventory system, Ford plants would
not be able to produce vehicles . . . . In short, a collapse of
one of our competitors here would have a ripple effect across
all automakers, suppliers, and dealers-a loss of nearly three
million jobs in the first year, according to an estimate by the
Center for Automotive Research.2 15
The U.S. auto industry's supply chain has thus evolved to the point
where every auto firm depends up on the same few large suppliers.
Bankruptcy of any significant firm in any part of the auto supply chain
could well cause a disaster for the entire industry due to the current
lack of "redundancy" in the supply chain.216 The Japanese auto industry
212. See id.
213. See, e.g., id. at 25-26.
214. Id. at 25.
215. Id.
216. See BARRY C. LYNN, END OF THE LINE: THE RISE AND COMING FALL OF
THE GLOBAL CORPORATION 180 (2005) [hereinafter LYNN, END OF THE LINE] ("As early
as 1988, both Ford and GM would boast that some 98 percent of the parts they
purchased from outside suppliers were 'single-sourced.' This was a radical change from
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might well be similarly fragile because it too has a supply chain that
lacks redundancy.217 Portions of the U.S. food supply chain might be
similarly fragile.218
2. FRAGILITY CAUSED BY THE GEOGRAPHIC PROXIMITY OF SUPPLIERS
AND NATURAL DISASTERS
When a large proportion of firms are in close proximity to one
another an entire industry can become unduly fragile. Sheffi and Lynn
provide a dramatic example:
[A]lmost a quarter of the world's integrated circuit (IC)
design and fabrication capacity is concentrated between
Taiwan's Hsinchu area and Taipei, which are only 40 miles
apart. Taiwan is also home to almost 70 percent of the
a decade earlier when, as one vice-president for materials management at GM put it,
'our practice was to double- or perhaps triple-source every part."').
217. See Barry C. Lynn, How Detroit Went Bottom-Up, THE AMERICAN
PROSPECT, October 2009, at 21.
In any system organized along these lines, a natural or man-made disaster
that knocks some keystone factory off line can trigger a cascading industrial
crash that paralyzes production everywhere. The best recent illustration of
how such a crash plays out comes from Japan, where the automotive
industry there has been structurally monopolized in much the same way as
in America. The fantastic physical instability of such a structure was made
clear in July 2007, when an earthquake in Niigata province smashed a
piston-ring factory run by a small supplier named Riken. Within hours, the
loss of this one plant led all 12 of Japan's main car and truck manufacturers
to shut down. It turned out they all relied on one factory to produce a
component that cost less than $5.
Id. at 24.
An earlier Japanese example occurred in 1997,
[w]hen a fire at the Aisin Seiki plant in Kariya destroyed machinery used to
build proportioning valves for the rear brakes of Toyota automobiles. In the
years leading up to the fire, Toyota had pioneered a practice of "lean"
production, which includes reliance on single sources of supply and the
holding of almost no inventory (sometimes called "just-in-time"
manufacturing). Hence, within a matter of hours a shortage of p-valves
forced Toyota to close its entire main production operation in nearby
Toyota City. By the time Toyota's employees fully restored production of
p-valves more than a week later, Toyota had suffered a huge hit, with
production falling some 70,000 vehicles below projections.
Barry C. Lynn, Built to Break, CHALLENGE, March/April 2012, at 87, 94-95
[hereinafter Lynn, Built to Break].
218. For a large number of examples, see BARRY C. LYNN, CORNERED 4
(2010) ("[Allmost the entire U.S. pet food industry had come to depend, to various
degrees, on a single supplier of canned and pouched pet food. . . . [T]he Menu Foods
recall covered products that had been retailed under a phenomenal 150 different
names.") (citation omitted).
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world's IC foundry capacity as well as most of the global
capacity for IC packaging and testing. A Taiwanese disruption
would affect most industries since most machinery now
involves electronics. In fact, such a disruption took place in
September 1999 when an earthquake disrupted semiconductor
makers that account for 40 percent of the world's memory
chip production. This occurred during a period of tight
supplies, and the spot price of computer memory climbed
fivefold all over the world, disrupting operations at many
electronic suppliers and hampering the launch of certain
Apple laptops.21 9
Lynn presents evidence that the interdependency problem is
growing worse, and he provides other examples that could result in
even worse disruptions.220 For example, he notes that "[s]ome 60
percent of the world's DRAM (dynamic random-access memory) chip
manufacturing capacity is located in South Korea, mainly in and around
Seoul."221 As an example of one possible method of dealing with this
fragility, Lynn commends the Reagan administration for attempting to
diversify and thereby make more stable the international DRAM market
(for which Japan in 1986 had a seventy-five percent worldwide share)222
by "a combination of tariffs, quotas, subsidies, and arm-twisting."22 3
219. Sheffi & Lynn, supra note 211, at 26 (citation omitted). For additional
examples, see LYNN, END OF THE LINE, supra note 216, at 211-36.
220. Lynn, Built to Break, supra note 217, at 100-01:
[O]ne way to comprehend the new nature of risk within these international
systems is to compare two discrete events, both of which also took place in
Japan, the Kobe earthquake of 1995 and the Tohoku earthquake and tsunami
of 2011. In the first month after the disaster in Kobe, in the heart of Japan's
intensely industrialized south, domestic production fell by 3 percent, and
international effects were minimal. After the 2011 tsunami, by contrast,
Japan's industrial output fell an astounding 15.3 percent, almost double the
previous record fall, after the panic of 2008. Most surprising was how big a
fall-13.5 percent-was registered outside the disaster zone . . . . The
disruptions extended across a remarkably wide array of industrial activities,
including personal computers, mobile telephones, electronics, appliances,
robotics, telecommunications gear, specialty steel, photovoltaics, and
chemicals. The world automotive industry alone saw production plummet
some 30 percent, for more than three months.
221. Id. at 90-91, 87-107. Lynn provides additional examples: "More than 80
percent of the raw chemicals that go into the U.S. pharmaceutical system are
manufactured in China. All the ascorbic acid (Vitamin C) used to preserve processed
foods in the United States now comes from China." Id. at 91.
222. Id. at 98 ("American firms, meanwhile, which had controlled 70 percent
of the world market in 1978, had seen their share of the market plummet to only 20
percent.").
223. Barry C. Lynn, A Glitch in the Matrix, FOREIGN POL'Y (Sept. 12, 2012,
12:19 AM), www.foreignpoliy.com/articles/2012/09/1 1/industrial revolution?
WISCONSIN LAW REVIEW
3. VULNERABILITY CAUSED BY POLITICAL FACTORS
The OPEC oil boycott is surely the most well-known economic
disruption caused for political purposes (not counting the economic
disruptions caused by wars). Lynn points out that the OPEC example is
hardly unique.224 For example, in 2010 China cut off exports of rare
earth metals to Japan because of their dispute over a group of islands in
the East China Sea.225 Similarly, Russia cut off Ukraine's gas supply in
2014 for political reasons .226 The 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United
States also could be placed into this category. To give just one example
of the economic disruption caused by these attacks, "US airlines expe-
rienced such a shortfall in demand that it threatened their existence. In
response, Congress passed a massive aid package (fifteen billion
dollars) that (at least temporarily) saved most of the domestic airlines
from bankruptcy." 227
Lynn points out that
the structure of today's system leaves us entirely exposed to
political disasters in third states, as well as within states. Even
if leaders in Beijing and Washington forged the most perfect
of ententes, they would not be able to exert complete control
over the human beings who control other states. They would
not, for instance, be able to guarantee that North Korea would
never disrupt South Korea's highly concentrated DRAM
industry. Nor could they guarantee that Pakistan will never
disrupt the flow of processed information from India to the
back offices of corporations in the United States, Europe,
Japan, and China.2 2 8
In each of these situations a larger number of effective competitors
would have minimized the chances of problems causes by the relatively
unexpected market disruption. A larger number of competitors also
would have reduced firms' incentives to exploit any abnormal market
[https://perma.cc/E8MM-VDQL] ("In the 1980s, when Tokyo moved to capture
command over the production of computer components like DRAMS, the Reagan
administration used a combination of tariffs, quotas, subsides, and arm-twisting to force
the shift of much of that industrial capacity to third-party nations, such as Taiwan,
South Korea and Singapore. The goal was not to bring this vital capacity home, nor to
restore manufacturing jobs in America. It was to make the international system itself
more competitive, more international, and more stable.").
224. See Sheffi & Lynn, supra note 211.
225 Id. at 26-27.
226. Id. at 27.
227. Id. at 24.
228. Barry C. Lynn, Shock Therapy: Building Resilient International Systems,
in GLOBAL FLOW SECURITY 197 (Eric Brattberg & Daniel S. Hamilton eds., 2014).
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situations because firms doing this would risk lost future patronage,
especially if another firm in the market would continue to sell at
previous prices.
C. Competitive Problems Caused by "Normal" and "Unusual" Events
Any number of "normal" and "unusual" factors (these terms are in
quotes because they are of course impossible to define and are
arbitrary) can cause the amount or nature of competition in a market to
change, sometimes quickly and dramatically. If a market starts with
only the minimum number of firms necessary for effective competition,
such changes could well result in a market with N - 1 competitors-or
worse. A few examples will show that these possibilities are real
enough. In the pharmaceuticals business, one such shock can be the
discovery of contamination or other problems in the manufacturing
process. 229 The FDA maintains a list of about 100 drugs that are in
short supply, and has explained the underlying problem in an article in
the New England Journal of Medicine: "If only a few companies make
a drug and one of them encounters a manufacturing problem, the
remaining companies may not be able to meet the demand." 230 In the
case of the widely used anesthetic propanol, for example, there were
only three firms supplying the U.S. market, and then one of them,
Hospira, had to recall multiple batches after discovering particulate
matter in the vials. 2 31 According to one newsletter, the alternative
suppliers then "made out like bandits. "232 The former "Big Eight" of
accounting firms had shrunk through mergers to become the "Big Five"
without objection from the antitrust authorities.233 Then, however,
Arthur Andersen was caught up in the Enron scandal, was criminally
prosecuted, and subsequently went out of business .234 After that, the
industry was left with only four major competitors. Many observers
229. Example taken from Averitt, supra note 9.
230. Valerie Jensen & Bob A. Rappaport, The Reality of Drug Shortages -
The Case of the Injectable Agent Propofol, 363 NEW ENG. J. MED. 806, 806 (2010).
231. Id.
232. Eric Palmer, Hospira Returning to Market with Sedative Propofol,
FIERCEPHARMA (Nov. 9, 2012, 10:46 AM), https://www.fiercepharma.com/sales-and-
marketing/hospira-returning-to-market-sedative-propofo1 [https://perma.cc/6QPG-
79MX].
233. Example taken from Averitt, supra note 9. See generally Charles W.
Wootton & Carel M. Wolk, The Development of "The Big Eight" Accounting Firms in
the United States, 1900 to 1990, ACCT. HISTORIANS J., June 1992, at 1 (presenting a
historical overview of the development of "The Big Eight" accounting firms and the
subsequent mergers).
234. Elizabeth K. Ainslie, Indicting Corporations Revisited: Lessons of the
Arthur Anderson Prosecution, 43 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 107, 107-08 (2006).
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believe this provides inadequate choice given the obligation that each
publicly-traded company receive an audit from an accounting firm
235having a recognized level of expertise.
The government had allowed the music publishing industry, the
dominant owners of copyrights over performances of musical
compositions, to consolidate because of a perception that its market
position was declining. 23 6 However, the rapid changes in the
transmission of copyrighted music resulting from the growth of the
internet and services using it has transformed the business of licensing
the performance rights of such performances. Now the remaining three
major owners of such rights are alleged to be engaging in a variety of
anti-competitive and exploitive conduct.2 37
D. Divestiture Inadequacies
Many large corporations compete in a large number of product and
geographic markets. Hence, a merger between two such firms
frequently will raise competitive concerns in only some of those
markets. While there is case law that holds that if a merger is unlawful
in any particular market, then the entire merger is unlawful, 238 the long-
standing strategy of enforcement agencies is to focus on remedying the
specific areas of concern while allowing the rest of the combination to
go forward. These remedies, usually divestiture of assets in overlapping
market, have as their goal the preservation of competition. Given the
pro-merger stance of the agencies and the courts, and their goal of
retaining only N effective competitors in a market, failure of a remedy
often results in significant harm to competition.
To state the issues slightly differently, since the enforcers have a
significant failure rate for their settlements, given their practice of
allowing mergers until only N competitors are left, a failed divestiture
usually constitutes underenforcement of the Clayton Act. If remedy
failure is a recurring risk, then seeking to retain N + 1 or N + 2
competitors in any specific market would reduce dramatically the
probability that remedy failure would result in significant competitive
harm.
235. Christopher C. McKinnon, Auditing the Auditors: Antitrust Concerns in
the Large Company Audit Market, 11 N.Y.U. J.L. &Bus. 533, 571-72 (2015).
236. See Kristelia A. Garcia, Facilitating Competition by Remedial Regulation,
31 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 175, 187-89, 193, 210-18 (2016) (describing the competitive
harms resulting from the music publishing oligopoly). See also In re Pandora Media,
Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d 317 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), aff'd sub nom. Pandora Media, Inc. v.
ASCAP, 785 F.3d 73 (2d Cir. 2015) (documenting a number of tacit collusive activities
intended to exploit internet music services).
237. In re Pandora Media, Inc., 6 F. Supp. 3d at 317.
238. See Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 337 (1962).
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Sometimes agencies and courts impose remedies that are
completely conduct-oriented: i.e., the merger is permitted but the firms
are ordered to do or not to do specified things.239 Conduct oriented
remedies can be especially problematic because often the post-merger
firm has market power, but the enforcers and the courts hope the
prescribed or proscribed conduct will prevent it from exercising this
power. Indeed, Kwoka's research has shown that conduct remedies
allowed prices to rise by an average of sixteen percent, compared to the
seven percent price rise permitted by remedies involving divestitures. 24
Even more than for structural remedies, any failure can result in
significant harm to competition.241
The evidence on merger remedies shows, unfortunately, that both
the FTC and the Antitrust Division have a difficult time making sure
markets remain competitive when they design and implement a merger
remedy. In 1999, the FTC documented the uncertainties involved in a
comprehensive analysis of the competitive successes and failures of
divestitures in its merger remedy cases.242 It utilized a definition of a
"successful" divestiture that was overly generous to itself (which was
perhaps only natural: it had, after all, agreed to the divestitures) .243 The
study considered a divestiture to be a success if the divested assets
continued to operate to any degree in the relevant market. The study
did not even attempt to determine whether the divestiture had preserved
competition in the affected markets! Even using their overly generous
definition of a successful remedy, the study found that roughly twenty-
five percent of merger remedies had failed. 2 " The report also noted:
239. See, e.g., infra notes 252, 255-57, 260. These cases are examples of
times when courts impose conduct-oriented remedies.
240. See KWOKA, supra note 4, at 120 tbl. 7.9.
241. See also Kwoka, supra note 91, at 19-22.
242. FED. TRADE COMM'N, A STUDY OF THE COMMISSION'S DIVESTITURE
PROCEsS 10 (1999) [hereinafter THE 1999 REPORT],
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/study-commissions-
divestiture-process/divestiture_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/3TBC-B9SY].
243. The defensiveness of the FTC leadership about the quality of its
enforcement is quite evident in a 2016 speech by its Chair. See Edith Ramirez, Keynote
Remarks, 10th Annual Global Antitrust Enforcement Symposium, Georgetown
University Law School, 1-4 (Sept. 20, 2016), https://www.ftc.gov/public-
statements/2016/09/keynote-remarks-ftc-chairwoman-edith-ramirez
[https://perma.cc/Z5WC-PXJZ].
244. THE 1999 REPORT, supra note 242, concluded:
[T]hree quarters of the divestitures included in the Study succeeded to some
degree; of the 37 divestitures that were studied, 28 appear to have resulted
in viable operations in the relevant market. In each case, the approved
buyer acquired the assets, began operations, and was operating in the
relevant market within a reasonable period. In some of these cases, the
buyer reported that it introduced new products, it is pricing below the
respondent, or it is taking share from the respondent. In the remaining nine
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"This is comparable to the success rate reported for privately negotiated
mergers and acquisitions."24 5 The report did not evaluate at all those
merger remedies that only involved some regulation of the conduct of
the merged entity.24
In 2016 the FTC published another study of remedies, one that
analyzed the 1999-2015 period. Again, the agency found that its own
remedies had been generally "effective." 247 But this study still found a
substantial number of failures.248 Moreover, once again its criteria for
success were overly modest and the report did not provide much
support for its conclusions-some of which rested primarily on staff
perceptions of competitiveness in industries.249
No comparable internal report has emerged from the Antitrust
Division with respect to its settlements. External reviews such as those
from Kwoka and Ashenfelter et. al. suggest that remedies the Division
has accepted also have a significant failure rate .250 Based on these
divestitures, the buyers are not operating viably in the relevant market. (In
one of those nine, the buyer was operating viably, but not in the relevant
market of concern to the Commission; in another, the buyer was operating
viably but not independently of the respondent.). Approximately 75 percent
of the divestitures were successful.
Id. at 8, 10.
245. Id. at 10 (footnote omitted). The omitted footnote reads:
Ravenscraft and Scherer, for example, suggest that "roughly a third" of
their sample of private transactions were viewed as failures by the acquiring
firms. D. RAVENSCRAFT AND F.M. SCHERER, MERGERS, SELL-OFFS, AND
ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY 192-93 (1987). Michael Porter's contemporaneous
review of the acquisitions puts the failure rate much higher. He found
"more than half" the acquisitions he studied were sold off because they did
not meet the acquiring firm's expectations. Porter, "From Competitive
Advantage to Corporate Strategy," HARV. Bus. REV. 45 (May-June 1987).
Id. at 10 n.19.
246. These remedies are frequently unsuccessful. See, e.g., Time Warner,
FTC Docket No. C-3709, https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-
proceedings/9610004/time-warner-inc-turner-broadcasting-system-inc-tele
[https://perma.cc/BQ96-KTEC] (repeated efforts to create enforceable conduct
regulations); see also, John Kwoka, Merger Remedies: An Incentives/Constraints
Framework, 62 ANTITRUST BULL. 367, 374-75 (2017).




248. Id. at 18. See also John Kwoka, One-and-a-Half Cheers for the New FTC
Remedies Study (Feb. 7, 2018) (unpublished manuscript),
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=3112689
[https://perma.cc/3ECZ-8D7G].
249. See generally FED. TRADE COMM'N, supra note 247.
250. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. In partial contrast, the EU's
track record was found to be somewhat better in a study using a methodology similar to
Kwoka's. PETER ORMOSI, FRANCO MARIUZZO & RICHARD HAVELL, A REVIEW OF
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aggregated analyses it seems fair to conclude that the American
agencies have failed to preserve sufficient competition in many of these
markets such that selective divestiture at the N level results in a
significant risk of competitive harm.25 '
There have been many conspicuous examples of merger divestiture
failures. For example, the FTC agreed to allow Hertz to acquire a
substantial competitor in the airport car rental market, Dollar Thrifty,
on condition that Hertz divest its own Advantage line.252 This settlement
might have been marginally adequate if Advantage had remained a
vigorous competitor. The FTC provisionally accepted the settlement on
a split vote of four to one. 253 Later, however, the spun-off Advantage
firm went into bankruptcy after Hertz terminated the lease under which
Advantage obtained its rental cars. 2 54 Thus, Advantage was seriously
impaired as a competitor in the car rental market, and a marginally
competitive situation became an undesirable one. Car rental rates-
particularly at the lower end of the market-then increased at the fastest
255pace since the recession.
In 2015, Albertsons and Safeway sought to merge. The FTC
determined that in over 114 local markets there would be a significant
increase in concentration and a substantial likelihood that consumers
would face higher prices and reduced choice.256 Instead of barring the
merger, the FTC agreed that the companies would divest stores in these
markets.257 However, the stores' primary buyer incurred major
MERGER DECISIONS IN THE EU: WHAT CAN WE LEARN FROM Ex-POST EVALUATIONS?
(2015), http://ec.europa.eu/competition/publications/reports/kd01 15715enn.pdf
[https://perma.cc/AQ6V-B8PZ].
251. See also Kwoka, supra note 248.
252. Example taken from Averitt, supra note 17. See Hertz Global Holdings,
Inc., 156 F.T.C. 10 (2013).
253. Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm'n, FTC Requires Divestitures for
Hertz's Proposed $2.3 Billion Acquisition of Dollar Thrifty to Preserve Competition in
Airport Car Rental Markets (Nov. 15, 2012), https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-
releases/2012/1 1/ftc-requires-divestitures-hertzs-proposed-23-billion-acquisition
[https://perma.cc/THU8-YLBM].
254. Katy Stech, Bankruptcy Judge Approves Advantage Rent a Car Sale to
Catalyst, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 4, 2014, 4:08 PM),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/bankruptcy-judge-approves-advantage-rent-a-car-sale-to-
catalyst- 1388783272 [https://perma.cc/3RV8-6AWK].
255. See Research & Statistics, AUTO RENTAL NEWS,
http://www.autorentalnews.com/content/research-statistics.aspx
[https://perma.cc/377Q-9RRU] (listing U.S. car rental market data from 2000-17).
256. Complaint at 4-5, Cerberus Institutional Partners, F.T.C. File No. 141-
0108 (2015).
257. Cerberus Institutional Partners, F.T.C. File No. 141-0108 (2015), 2015
WL 471353, 6-8, 18-32 (decision and order).
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operating problems and went bankrupt.25 8 As a result, the merged firm
recaptured many of those stores.259 Thus, the remedy was totally
ineffective in preserving the competitive structure of more than 100
local grocery markets.
Also in 2015, the FTC settled its challenge to Dollar Tree's
acquisition of Family Dollar by requiring divestiture of 323 stores in
local markets that would otherwise have been highly concentrated.260 in
2017 the buyer was unable to continue to operate the resulting business
and the stores were sold to Dollar General, another very large firm. 261
Thus, the end result was that industry concentration was increased in
exactly the way that the FTC had determined was competitively
harmful.
In a number of settlements involving the generic drug industry, the
FTC has required that specific drugs be divested.26 2 However, it has
ignored the broader portfolio of generics that the dominant firms have
acquired. As a result of a recent merger, one firm has 720 generic drug
lines, and is "far larger than the second leading generic drug
manufacturer."263 Moreover, when authorizing the latest combination,
the FTC did nothing to ensure that there would be competitive
portfolios and instead allowed the various divested lines to be scattered
among a number of buyers .264 The impact of this transformation of the
generic drug industry is evident from the initiation of a series of price
fixing conspiracy cases targeting the same companies that the FTC has
allowed to expand.26 5
258. Peg Brickley, West Coast Grocer Haggen Files for Chapter 11
Bankruptcy: Haggen sued rival grocer Albertsons over 146-store deal, WALL ST. J.
(Sept. 9, 2015, 5:06 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/west-coast-grocer-haggen-
files-for-chapter-11 -bankruptcy- 1441798163 [https://perma.cc/634N-U9E].
259. Brent Kendall & Peg Brickley, Albertsons to Buy Back 33 Stores It Sold
as Part of Merger With Safeway; Judge approves purchase as part of Haggen Holdings'
Bankruptcy Process, WALL ST. J. (Nov. 25, 2015, 7:26 PM),
https://wwW.wsj.com/articles/albertsons-to-buy-back-33-stores-it-sold-as-part-of-
merger-with-safeway-1448411193 [https://perma.cc/LX8W-W3GQ].




261. Jon Springer, Dollar General to Acquire 323 Stores, SUPERMARKET NEWS
(Apr. 3, 2017), http://www.supernarketnews.com/retail-financial/dollar-general-
acquire-323-stores [https://perma.cc/23RQ-72CZ].
262. Kwoka, supra note 246, at 378.
263. Id.
264. Id. at 379. Kwoka also observed that the statistical probability of the
remedies being effective in all 80 generic lines were only 1.65 percent. Id. at 379 n.24.
265. See, e.g., In re Generic Pharms. Pricing Antitrust Litig., 227 F. Supp.
3d 1402 (J.P.M.L. 2016).
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The Antitrust Division's record is no better. In the case of airlines,
having once stopped United from buying US Airways,266 the Division
thereafter allowed mergers with minimal divestiture of airport landing
rights which remain concentrated in the hands of a few airlines .267 The
result, as noted earlier in this Article, is that airfares have grown
dramatically while the quality of service has declined.268
In the case of the Dean-Suiza merger, the Division raised no
objections after a prolonged investigation during which the merged firm
contracted to divest a number of plants.269 In fact, the Division's own
economists predicted that prices of milk would go up as a result of the
merger.270 Subsequent litigation based on the collusion that the merger
made possible included a finding by the plaintiffs' economist that prices
had risen more than three times what the Division had predicted.271
On the conduct side, the Division recognized the risks to upstream
content suppliers in allowing NBC to combine with Comcast.272 The
conduct remedy sought to ensure equal access and reasonable treatment
of the independent content suppliers.273 Most observers have concluded
that the decree was ineffective in providing the kind of treatment that
would have ensured effective competition among content suppliers.274
In sum, by allowing mergers that resulted in specific markets
becoming concentrated down to the N level, the agencies have created
an impossible situation. The only way the relevant markets can retain
competition is if the agreed-to remedies are always effective. This is,
however, an impossibility. The enforcers instead should insist that the
266. See United-US Airways Merger Dead, ABC NEWS,
http://abcnews.go.com/Business/story?id=87893 [https://perma.cc/2QUA-L4KW] (last
visited Sept. 24, 2018).
267. See Sholnn Freeman, Clearing Antitrust Hurdle, Delta Clinches
Acquisition of Northwest, WASH. POST (Oct. 30, 2008),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2008/10/29/AR2008102903505.html [https://perma.cc/Y2PJ-
RAP6]; Jia Lynn Yang, Justice Department Clears United, Continental Merger for
Takeoff, WASH. POST (Aug. 27, 2010, 9:45 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2010/08/27/AR2010082705257.html[https://perma.cc/VS9R-5G87].
268. See Brunecker, Lee & Singer, supra note 107.
269. See Press Release, Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Requires Suiza




271. See In re Se. Milk Antitrust Litig., 739 F.3d 262, 268, 285 (6th Cir.
2014).
272. See Complaint at 19-22, United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F. Supp.
2d 145 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 11-106).
273. See Final Judgment at 9-22, United States v. Comcast Corp., 808 F.
Supp. 2d 145 (D.D.C. 2011) (No. 11-106); see also Kwoka, supra note 246, at 373.
274. See Kwoka, supra note 246, at 373.
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relevant markets retain at least one more significant firm as resilient
"redundancy."
E. The Need for Resilient Redundancy: An Airlines Example
The airline industry provides one of the best examples of the
failure of a policy that seeks to identify the optimal N for an industry.
Over a period of a few years the major legacy carriers combined to
reduce the number of airlines with hub and spoke systems from six to
three which, presumably the DOJ believed to be the appropriate N.275
But in fact, the result was at least N - 1 because adverse competitive
effects resulted from those combinations.276 Perhaps the enforcers
counted on the discount airlines led by Southwest and AirTran to deter
price increases, but the merger of those two airlines has resulted in
very significant fare increases in all the markets that they had served.2"
Significantly, a merger simulation (one of the tools used to estimate the
likely effects of a merger on prices) would have shown little predicted
effect.278 But the actual effects were very substantial.2 79 Apparently the
simulation model did not capture the dynamics of the overall airline
market in which the discount carriers played a vital role in restraining
prices of the legacy airlines as well as their own prices. Thus, there
was a second failure to maintain the minimum N necessary to preserve
and protect competition. A policy concerned with the incipient risks of
consolidation in the overall airline industry would have blocked many,
perhaps all, of these mergers to retain an airline market with six or
seven major competitors.
CONCLUSION: "RESILIENT REDUNDANCY" REQUIRES INCIPIENCY
Humans are fortunate to have evolved to possess two lungs, two
kidneys and many other similarly "redundant" biological systems. One
shouldn't assume these duplications are inefficient and unnecessary.
Rather, we recognize they constitute an insurance policy against semi-
expected and unexpected calamities. The resilient redundancy idea
275. See supra note 102 and accompanying text.
276. See id.
277. See Pukar KC, supra note 107.
278. Id. at 18 (the model predicted price increases on average of less than a
dollar).
279. Id. at 10-12 (prices up significantly in the markets where they both had
competed or where Air Trans had been a potential competitor of Southwest as well as
in markets from which Southwest withdrew AirTran service after the merger).
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applies to entire ecosystems as well. 280 Market competition in the
medium and long term benefits in a similar ways from having some
apparent short term protective "redundancy." 28 1
American Antitrust Institute founder Bert Foer aptly observed that
"market economies are reluctant to bear the costs of redundancy and
stockpiling-the incentive to plan for disaster, it seems, isn't
transparent. "282 But is not, Foer asks, the absence of protection against
risk a huge systemic inefficiency? 283 Foer is hardly alone in raising such
insightful questions.284
280. Professor Horton has drawn insights from evolution for competition
policy:
A further potential cost of systemic adaptability and robustness is the need
for systemic redundancies. As Scott Page notes: "if a system contains
redundant parts, then it will be more robust to the failure of one of the
parts." Nassim Nicholas Taleb similarly observes that "[1]ayers of
redundancy are the central risk management property of natural systems."
Such "redundancy is not defensive; it is more like investment than
insurance." Geerat Vemieij agrees. Seemingly "inefficient" and sometimes
"expensive" diversity also positively "affects responsiveness, the ability of
the system to respond to disturbances." A diversity of possible responses
increases the number of exogenous and endogenous disturbances that a
system can absorb. For example, humans' adaptive immune systems are
biologically "expensive." Yet, "immunity diversity" has played a critical
role in humans' evolutionary survival and success.
Horton, supra note 22, at 181 (footnotes omitted),
Indeed the tragic 1845-48 Irish potato famine was in part caused by a quest for
short term efficiency that left the Irish food supply unduly fragile: "Irish cultivators
were at the cutting edge of technology, adopting the plow, monoculture, and little
genetic variation between plants. As they do today, these signatures of industrial
agriculture both raised yields and made it more likely that a disease engulfing one field
would engulf them all." Raj Patel, Seeds of Destruction, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., April
16, 2017, at 9.
281. Of course, the desirability of having extra firms' in a market can be taken
too far. As Professor Horton notes in an analogous context,
[elvolutionary theory appropriately recognizes that there are limits to
competitive diversity in any complex system, and that "too much diversity
may well produce either chaos or randomness," or environmental
degradation. What it does mean, however, is that "a system is more robust,
more efficient, or more innovative if it contains the appropriate amount and
kinds of diversity."
Horton, supra note 22, at 178 (footnotes omitted).
282. Albert Foer, On the Inefficiencies of Efficiency as the Single-Minded Goal
of Antitrust, 60 ANTITRUST BULL. 103, 119 n.65 (2015) (quoting Siddhartha Mahanta,
New York's Looming Food Disaster, ATLANTIC CITIES (Oct. 21, 2013),
www.citylab.com/equity/2013/10/new-works-looming-food-disaster/7294/
[https://perma.cc/5A3X-463P]).
283. Id. at 120.
284. Id. at 127 (citing other similar expression of concern). Vermeij adds:
"[r]edundancy may be at odds with economic efficiency, but in the long run it is better
to have a safety net of redundant production than to be efficient and dead." Geerat J.
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Moreover, as Barry Lynn and others have documented, allowing
mergers that unduly limit the number of suppliers results in an
unacceptably high risk of serious disruption and problems for an entire
economic system.285 Similar to key systems in the human body having
"redundancy," there is a need for protective "redundancy" in our
economic systems. This would be true even if it caused a somewhat
higher short term cost for the resulting products. While the
overwhelming body of evidence supports the fact that there are no
significant efficiency costs for the necessary redundancy, any minor
costs that arose would be the equivalent of a modest insurance
premium. One way of explaining the resilient "redundancy" rationale
underlying the incipiency doctrine is by characterizing it as a method
for insuring medium and long term competition despite the vagaries of
luck, randomness, and/or historical accident.
The fact that competition can and does change unpredictably adds
to the uncertainty that exists when courts or agencies attempt to assess
whether a merger among substantial competitors could result in a
lessening of competition. When combined with the empirical
observation that these mergers rarely make any significant contribution
to increased productive efficiency or innovation, the case for rejecting
mergers among major competitors is even more powerful. The
incipiency doctrine provides the vehicle for the agencies and courts to
refuse to allow such combinations.
The structural thresholds in the current Merger Guidelines reflect
only a weak version of the incipiency concern. They only presume that
market power will be created or enhanced if a merger increases
concentration by an HHI of more than 200 points to a level in excess of
2500.286 But even at these modest thresholds, the courts and agencies
have failed to implement the commands of the Clayton Act
consistently.287 Moreover, recent empirical work has shown that the
level of concentration at which the Guidelines' presumption is triggered
is often too high. It appears that effective competition generally
requires an N + 1 or N + 2 over the currently allowed levels, so that
relevant markets have a least five substantial competitors. This implies
Vermeij, Comparative Economics: Evolution and the Modem Economy, 11 J.
BIOECONOMICs 105, 128 (2009). He argues generally in favor of "greater redundancy,
meaning that the system becomes more forgiving of error and disruption, and that
variants arising within the system are not automatically crippling to it." GEERAT J.
VERMEIJ, NATURE: AN EcONOMIC HISTORY 139 (2004).
285. See supra Part IV.
286. 2010 MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 8, 1 5.3.
287. See generally KWOKA, supra note 4.
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that the incipiency standard should start at HHI levels of 2000 or
less.288
Another way to implement a revitalized incipiency doctrine would
be to vigorously implement Philadelphia National Bank's originally
formulated presumption against significant mergers among major
competitors in any moderately concentrated markets .289 These mergers
"must be enjoined in the absence of evidence clearly showing that the
merger is not likely to have such anticompetitive effects." 29 0 Courts and
agencies may have been reluctant to implement the incipiency doctrine
vigorously out of the mistaken belief that the doctrine makes no sense.
The "resilient redundancy" idea explains how the incipiency doctrine is
essential to preserving workably competitive markets for the benefit of
consumers and the entire economy .291 It is our hope that once they
understand the basis for the doctrine, courts and agencies will
implement the incipiency doctrine much more aggressively, in the
manner that Congress intended.
288. See id.; John Kwoka & Chengyan Gu, Predicting Merger Outcomes: The
Accuracy of Stock Market Event Studies, Market Structure Characteristics, and Agency
Decisions, 58 J.L. & EcoN. 519, 535 (2015).
289. For a similar analysis and conclusion, see Kwoka, supra note 121.
290. United States v. Phila. Nat'1 Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963).
291. "An outside idea has a chance to influence government policy only if it
has two characteristics. First, it can be stated in a simple declarative sentence. Second,
once stated it is obviously true." Emily Parker, To Be Read by All Parties, N.Y. TIMES
BOOK REV. (Feb. 17, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/books/review/the-
impact-of-books-on-washington-policy.html?pagewanted= all& r= 0 (referencing a
statement by John T. McNaughton).
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